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Paying Patients: Legal and Ethical
Dimensions
Govind Persad1
20 YALE J. L. & TECH. 177 (2018)
This Article explores the implications for medical care of a
debate that is more familiar in the law and ethics of human
subjects research: whether people should be paid to receive or
decline medical interventions, or to reach certain health
objectives. It examines the legal and ethical issues such
payments raise, and considers various actors who might make
such payments, including governments, employers, insurers,
care providers, and private parties. It argues for two
interrelated conclusions: first, that these payments should not
be subject to blanket normative condemnation, and, second, that
payments made in different settings and contexts frequently
share underlying commonalities, which suggests categorizing
them according to these commonalities. We should move from a
"siloed" legal and normative landscape, where discussions of
payments to patients in one context are isolated from similar
discussions in other contexts, to a landscape where payments
are evaluated and categorized more systematically. The
categories along which payments should be evaluated include
who the payer is, what purpose the payment serves, and who the
payment affects.
In Part I, I identify and present four categories of payments
to patients. These include value-based insurance designs in
which insurers offer patients a share of the savings realized
when they choose cheaper medications; providers paying
patients to adhere to treatment regimens; and private parties
paying others to make health decisions such as avoiding
pregnancy.
In Part II, I examine the normative issues raised by these
payments. I argue that the risk of exploitation or undue
psychological pressure is low, but that we should be more
concerned about ways in which the payments might change
relationships between payers and payees or might harm the

Assistant Professor, Department of Health Policy and Management, Johns
Hopkins University. J.D., Stanford Law School; Ph.D., Stanford University. I
am grateful to colleagues at the Berman Institute of Bioethics, to Kristin
Madison and others at the 2016 Health Law Professors Conference, and to
Christina Ho and John Jacobi for their detailed comments at a presentation
of these ideas at the 2017 Mid-Atlantic Health Law Works-in-Progress
Retreat, as well as to other retreat attendees for their feedback. I am also
grateful to Alan Wertheimer, Zeke Emanuel, Christine Grady, Harald
Schmidt, and Richard Yetter Chappell for discussion of related ideas.
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interests of third parties. In developing this analysis, I draw on
work in the ethics of human subjects research.
In Part III, I use the ethical analysis developed in Part II to
develop normative frameworks for the evaluation of payments to
patients. These frameworks identify and differentiate the
responsibilities of different actors in the health care system. In
doing so, these frameworks draw from and build on theories of
distributive fairness. They also draw from accounts of
professional and business ethics that prescribe specific
responsibilitiesfor professionals.
Finally, in Part IV, I examine how these normative
frameworks would bear on the legal issues that payments to
patients raise. These include whether the payments are subject
to taxation or might affect recipients' eligibility for need-based
benefits; whether they are consistent with antidiscrimination
law; and whether they violate anti-kickback statutes or
regulations.
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INTRODUCTION

Debate about whether subjects should be paid to participate
in medical research is a longstanding part of the law and ethics
of human subjects research protection. Some have raised
concerns about exploitation of subjects or psychological
pressure. Others have worried that payments undermine
public-spiritedness or jeopardize relationships between subjects
and researchers. Payments in medical care, such as payments
to patients receiving clinical care or to insured individuals
within a health care system, raise similar questions. Such
payments are already being made in some contexts, and their
importance is likely to increase in a regulatory environment
like that of the United States, where universal health care is
not publicly funded (and not likely to be) and where private
parties accordingly have a financial stake in other people's
health choices.
This Article will examine the legal and ethical issues raised
by paying patients to receive or decline medical interventions,
or to reach certain health objectives. It will consider various
actors who might make such payments, including governments,
employers, insurers, care providers, and private parties. It will
also consider some legal issues these payments raise.
Ultimately, it will argue for two interrelated conclusions: first,
that these payments should not be subject to blanket
normative condemnation and, second, that payments made in
different settings and contexts frequently share underlying
commonalities, which suggests categorizing them according to
these commonalities. We should move from a "siloed" legal and
normative landscape, where discussions of payments to
patients in one context are isolated from similar discussions in
other contexts, to a landscape where payments are evaluated
and categorized more systematically. The categories along
which payments should be evaluated include who the payer is,
what purpose the payment serves, and who the payment
affects.
In Part I, I identify and present four categories of payments
to patients. These include value-based insurance designs in
which insurers offer patients a share of the savings realized
when they choose cheaper medications; providers paying
patients to adhere to treatment regimens; and private parties
paying others to make health decisions such as avoiding
pregnancy.
In Part II, I examine the normative issues raised by these
payments. I argue that the risk of exploitation or undue
psychological pressure is low, but that we should be more
concerned about ways in which the payments might change
relationships between payers and payees or might harm the
interests of third parties. In developing this analysis, I draw on
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work in the ethics of human subjects research.
In Part III, I use the ethical analysis developed in Part II to
develop normative frameworks for the evaluation of payments
to patients. These frameworks identify and differentiate the
responsibilities of different actors in the health care system. In
doing so, these frameworks draw from and build on theories of
distributive fairness. They also draw from accounts of
professional and business ethics that prescribe specific
responsibilities for professionals.
Finally, in Part IV, I examine how these normative
frameworks would bear on the legal issues that payments to
patients raise. These include whether the payments are subject
to taxation or might affect recipients' eligibility for need-based
benefits; whether they are consistent with antidiscrimination
law; and whether they violate anti-kickback statutes or
regulations.

I. PAYING PATIENTS: FACTUAL SCENARIOS

Many actors pay individuals to make medical choices or to
achieve specific health outcomes, or have proposed paying
individuals to do so. These actors include agencies within
federal and state government (such as Medicare, Medicaid, and
the Veterans' Administration, as well as state and federal
employee health plans and various state and federal public
health programs); non-governmental organizations; health
insurers; hospitals and health care providers; and other private
parties.
Payments to patients are only one of the possible financial
incentives that might influence patients' choices. Discounted
medical care, such as charity care offered by hospitals or
providers, can also affect patients' choices. So can differential
pricing, where patients are charged for care according to their
status as insured or uninsured, or according to their ability to
pay. Indeed, the simple fact that medical care costs money
already makes financial considerations relevant to patients'
choices, because it presents trade-offs between medical care
and other goods. However, payments to patients use incentives
as a carrot-to encourage a choice-rather than as a stick that
imposes a penalty on certain choices.
In this Part, I review four potential contexts in which these
actors may choose to pay patients: (a) to incentivize patients'
use of specific medical interventions that are profitable for
providers; (b) to promote adherence to medical treatment
recommendations, such as pharmaceutical dosing schedules or
regular follow-up appointments; (c) to incentivize the choice of
cheaper or more cost-effective interventions; and (d) in
exchange for their achieving health outcomes, including both
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outcomes generally regarded as desirable (such as smoking
cessation) and more controversial outcomes (such as pregnancy
avoidance or carrying a pregnancy to term).
A. Paying for Use
In this Section, I discuss the use of coupons and discounts
to incentivize the use of medical care, as well as direct
payments to users of medical care.
1. Coupons and Discounts
Actors in the medical care system who gain financially from
the use of medical care, such as drug or device vendors, could
pay patients to purchase certain forms of health care. These
payments take advantage of the fact that insured patients do
not bear the full cost of medical care use, which means that a
seller who pays patients to use a specific product can also
capture some of an insurer's spending. The use of coupons for
prescription drugs is a prominent example. As Joseph Ross and
Aaron Kesselheim observe, by offering coupons that lower the
out-of-pocket cost of a drug, pharmaceutical companies are able
to direct insurer spending toward specific drugs:
On a population level, drug coupons undermine
the tiered-formulary system that commercial
insurers have implemented to limit prescriptiondrug spending. When patients use coupons to
obtain brand-name medications, their out-ofpocket spending is reduced. But insurers must
still pay the higher cost of the medication to the
manufacturer. The more that patients use drug
coupons to obtain brand-name medications when
lower-cost alternatives are available, the more
2
expenses will rise for their insurers.
Ross and Kesselheim note that coupons bypass the cost-sharing
arrangements that insurers or other payers agree to with
patients (such as value-based insurance arrangements), and
have been challenged in court as illegal kickbacks. 3 In
particular, because the federal anti-kickback statute "prohibits
knowingly paying a party to stimulate business that is in turn
paid for by a federal health care program," "federal policy
currently prohibits the use of coupons by patients in publicly
subsidized drug-insurance programs such as Medicare and
2

3

Joseph S. Ross & Aaron S. Kesselheim, Prescription-DrugCoupons No Such
Thing as a FreeLunch, 369 NEw ENGL. J. MED. 1188, 1189 (2013).
Id.
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Moving from coupons to direct payments, there are several
examples where medical care providers go beyond discounting
the cost of care to paying patients outright to use an
intervention. As Kesselheim and Ross note, this practice
violates federal law when it involves payments to Medicaid or
5
Medicare patients to use services paid for by those programs.
Examples of these positive payments are described in case
law, including payments to patients who submitted their
Medicare claims or filled prescriptions through certain
pharmacies, 6 payments to attend psychiatric hospitalization
programs, 7 payments to visit a clinic, 8 and payments to use a
specific hospital. 9 A recent New York case provides a
representative example of such arrangements when it
discusses "a scheme to defraud the Medicaid program by
utilizing paid recruiters, known as 'flyer guys,' to solicit
patients to receive dental services at the clinic in exchange for
some form of remuneration." 10 The Office of the Inspector
General has advised that payments to patients who are insured
through federal programs may violate the anti-kickback law,
which prohibits

4
5

6

7

8

Id.
42 U.S.C § 1320a-7b (2012); see also Alan Bloom & Charles B. Oppenheim,
Fraudin Managed Care: Old Wine in New Bottles, 18 WHITTIER L. REV. 13, 20
(1996): ("[There is also a fraud and abuse issue when a provider makes
payments to patients to induce the patients to use that provider. The issue is
raised when managed care organizations provide more benefits to patients or
reduce the copayments as an inducement for the Medicare beneficiaries to
enroll with that managed care organization.").
United States v. Medina, 485 F.3d 1291, 1295 (11th Cir. 2007) ("Kickbacks
were paid to entice patients to submit their medicare [sic] claims through
Ocean and/or United. A number of patient recruiters testified that they would
bring patients who needed to fill prescriptions to Ocean or United in
exchange for 50% of the profits made after submitting the claim to Medicare.
The recruiter would then share their 50% with the patient.").
United States v. Hunter, 628 F. App'x 904, 906 (5th Cir. 2015) ("Although
Medicare allows facilities to advertise their services, they may not pay
patients to attend a PHP program.").
United States v. Umawa Oke Imo, 739 F.3d 226, 231 (5th Cir. 2014) ("CNS
only accepted patients with Medicare or Medicaid ....

9

10

CNS .

.

. paid patients

whenever they visited the clinic for an initial assessment and any subsequent
reassessment.").
United States v. Bainbridge Mgmt., L.P., No. 01 CR 469-1, 2002 WL
31006135, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 5, 2002) (describing an indictment that
"alleges defendants ...
generated hospital admissions through cash
payments and benefits to patients").
Kim v. Bd. of Regents of State of N.Y., 4 N.Y.S.3d 369, 370 (N.Y. App. Div.
2015).
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[a]ny payment, including cash or other benefit,
given to a patient, provider, or supplier for
changing a prescription, or recommending or
requesting such a change, from one product to
another, unless the payment is fully consistent
with a "safe harbor" regulation, or other federal
provision governing the reporting of prescription
drug prices.1 1

In another example, a False Claims Act suit against Kmart for
offering discount coupons and gift cards to federal health care
beneficiaries survived a motion for summary judgment. 12 In the
United Kingdom, where treatment in public hospitals is
covered at government expense, a private health insurer paid
its patients to seek certain procedures in public hospitals
rather than private ones and was criticized for doing so.131
could not find examples of payments to patients with private
insurance described in the case law, perhaps because these
arrangements are typically legal and therefore generated no
litigation.
Providers of services could also pay patients for reasons
other than capturing insurers' spending. Providers could pay
patients who agree to receive a procedure from a trainee
physician or to receive a procedure at a time when demand is
lower. A new provider might pay patients to use its services in
order to build goodwill or raise its public profile, just as a nonhealth business might give away free products.
B. Paying for Adherence
A patient's medical outcomes depend not only on whether
medical professionals are able to accurately diagnose the
symptoms and recommend a course of treatment, but also on
11 Thomas N. Bulleit, Jr. & Joan H. Krause, Kickbacks, Courtesies or CostEffectiveness?: Application of the Medicare Antikickback Law to the Marketing
and Promotional Practices of Drug and Medical Device Manufacturers, 54
FOOD & DRUG L.J. 279, 287 (1999) (quoting Special Fraud Alert on
Arrangements for the Provision of Clinical Laboratory Services, 59 Fed. Reg.
65,372, at 65,376 (Dec. 19, 1994)).
12
United States ex rel. Yarberry v. Sears Holdings Corp., No. 09-CV-588-MJRPMF, 2013 WL 12111729, at *1 (S.D. Ill. Nov. 20, 2013) (denying a motion for
summary judgment on complaint that "Defendants Sears and Kmart violated
the federal False Claims Act ('FCA'), as well as the Anti-Kickback Statute
('AKS'), and parallel state statutes, by offering and paying monetary
inducements, such as cash gift cards and/or coupon promotions, to the
beneficiaries of Government Healthcare Programs ('GHPs') . . . including
Medicare, Medicaid, TRICARE and CHAMPUS, in exchange for beneficiaries
filling their prescriptions at Defendants' pharmacies").
13
Gill Plimmer & Alistair Gray, Insurers Accused of 'Bribing'Patients to Use
NHS, FIN. TIMES (April 1, 2014), http://www.ft.com/content/73bl1ed4-b9cl11e3-a3ef-00144feabdc0 [http://perma.cc/92UD-HYQ5].
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whether the patient is adherent or compliant with the course of
treatment recommended. Non-adherence can stem from
multiple sources, including inconvenience, cost, forgetfulness,
or skepticism about a treatment's value. Payments to patients
might be expected to increase adherence and potentially
generate socially valuable outcomes for at least two reasons:
First, patients may value good medical outcomes, but be
subject to psychological frailties that prevent them from
attaining those outcomes (in philosophical terms, they are
akratic or "weak-willed": they know what they should do, but
are unable to do it reliably). Some patients may be addicted to
harmful substances or mentally ill. 14 Even those who are not
may engage in hyperbolic discounting-they may give
insufficient weight to long-term benefits when deciding what to
do. Reliable, short-term financial rewards may help them
achieve the outcomes they value.
Second, the value of a given medical outcome to society may
be larger than its value to the patient. In this case, a perfectly
rational and non-altruistic patient would put less effort into
achieving that outcome than would be optimal from a societal
perspective. Even given the fact that patients are both
somewhat altruistic and only boundedly rational, financial
rewards could sometimes shift patients away from a course of
behavior that would be individually optimal toward one that
would be socially optimal. As Antonio Giufridda and David
Torgerson observe,
The consumption of health care is generally
sensitive to its price. All things being equal,
uptake or compliance will be lower when there is
a financial charge than when health care is free
to the patient .... [E]ven when free medical care

is the alternative, the use of some form of
15
financial inducement increases compliance.
In this Section, I review several examples of payment for
adherence. Cases where payment for adherence has been
particularly prevalent include (1) mental health treatment, (2)
substance use cessation, and (3) treatment of infectious
disease. These cases tend to be characterized by one or both of
two features: large positive externalities (benefits to society)
E.g., Tim Kendall, Paying Patients with Psychosis to Improve Adherence, 347
BMJ f5782 (2013) ("However, when the illness impairs insight, as is common
in people with psychoses such as schizophrenia, or leads to an erosion of
willpower, as can occur in people who misuse substances, supplementing
internal rewards with external incentives deserves serious consideration.").
15 Antonio Giuffrida & David J. Torgerson, Should We Pay the Patient?Review
of FinancialIncentives to Enhance Patient Compliance, 315 BMJ 703, 705-06
(1997).
14
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and/or a tendency for patients to make irrational decisions not
to adhere.
1. Mental Health Treatment
Payment for adherence has been frequently suggested in
the treatment of severe mental illness, such as psychosis. A
recent study by Stefan Priebe and co-authors asserts that
"observational studies with small samples suggest that
financial incentives may . . . improve drug adherence in
patients with psychotic disorders," and the study later
concludes on the basis of a novel randomized controlled trial
that "[o]ffering financial incentives to patients with psychotic
disorders who have poor adherence to maintenance treatment
with antipsychotics is effective in improving adherence."16 The
same study team has more recently concluded that these
17
incentives can be made cost-effective.
Financial incentives have also been used in practice to
incentivize treatment 18 and attendance at day treatment for
mentally ill individuals also involved in substance abuse. 19
However, a recent report concludes that "Ie]ven though
financial incentives seem to be an effective strategy for
enhancing medication adherence, there is no appetite among
clinicians to use them in practice." 20 The article observes that
none of the teams participating in the Priebe et al. study
continued the intervention after the study's end, despite the
fact that it showed effective results.21 A related qualitative
study suggests that providers viewed payments for adherence
to mental health medications as inherently wrong, 22 and an
earlier article reports that more than three-quarters of
23
providers had objections to such payments.
16

Stefan Priebe et al., Effectiveness of Financial Incentives to Improve
Adherence to Maintenance Treatment with Antipsychotics: Cluster
Randomised Controlled Trial, 347 BMJ e0138816 (2013).
17 Catherine Henderson et al., Cost-Effectiveness of Financial Incentives to
Promote Adherence to Depot Antipsychotic Medication: Economic Evaluation
ofa Cluster-Randomised Controlled Trial, 10 PLoS ONE e0138816 (2015).
18 Stephen Pereira, Dominic Beer & Carol Paton, Enforcing Treatment with
Clozapine: Survey of Views and Practice, 23 PSYCHIATRIC BULL. 342, 345
(1999).
19 Kate B. Carey & Michael P. Carey, Enhancing the Treatment Attendance of
Mentally Ill Chemical Abusers, 21 J. BEHAV. THERAPY & EXPERIMENTAL
PSYCHIATRY 205, 208 (1990).

20

Rebecca Gray, Cash, Choice, Antipsychotic Medicationand the Mental Health
Nurse, 22 J. PSYCHIATRIC

21

22

& MENTAL

HEALTH NURSING 149, 152 (2015).

Id.
Elizabeth Brown & Rebecca Gray, Tackling Medication Non-Adherence in
Severe Mental Illness: Where Are We Going Wrong?, 22 J. PSYCHIATRIC &
MENTAL HEALTH NURSING 192, 196 (2015).

23

Dirk Claassen et al., Money for Medication: FinancialIncentives to Improve
Medication Adherence in Assertive Outreach, 31 PSYCHIATRIC BULL. 4, 5
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2. Substance Use Cessation
Some substances, such as cocaine and nicotine, are both
harmful to health and psychologically and physically addictive.
Addiction weakens the patient's capacity to stop using the
substance, potentially preventing patients who want to reduce
or stop their substance use from doing so. Financial incentives
have been proposed as a way of buttressing patients'
psychological capacity to stop substance use.
Emma Giles and co-authors conducted a systematic review
and meta-analysis in 2014 examining payments to patients to
encourage smoking cessation. 24 They identified and reviewed
ten studies on the topic and ultimately concluded that
payments are an effective way of motivating the decision to
stop smoking. In an earlier review, Giuffrida and Torgerson
mention several studies that provided incentives for substance
use cessation. 25 The studies they identify include the following
interventions:
*
*
*

*

Vouchers worth $3 given to mentally ill substance
26
abusers who attended treatment sessions;
Payments to patients in exchange for their
27
compliance with a naltrexone treatment regimen;
The provision of vouchers worth varying amounts
to patients who abstained from cocaine use, with a
patient who remained abstinent for twelve weeks
receiving approximately $1000;28
Payment to patients in a methadone treatment
29
program who provided drug-free urine samples.

Many of these studies concluded that paying patients was

24

25
26
27

28

29

(2007).
Emma L. Giles et al., The Effectiveness of Financial Incentives for Health
Behaviour Change: Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis, 9 PLOS ONE
e90347 (2014).
Giuffrida & Torgerson, supra note 15, at 704.
Carey & Carey, supra note 19, at 206-207.
J. Grabowski et al., Effects of Contingent Payment on Compliance with a
Naltrexone Regimen, 6 AM. J. DRUG &ALCOHOL ABUSE 355, 355 (1979).
Stephen T. Higgins et al., A Behavioral Approach to Achieving Initial Cocaine
Abstinence, 148 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1218, 1219-20 (1991) [hereinafter Higgins
et al., A Behavioral Approach]; Stephen T. Higgins et al., Incentives Improve
Outcome in Outpatient Behavioural Treatment of Cocaine Dependence. 51
ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 568, 574-75 (1994); John R. Hughes, Florian
Foerg & Gary Badger, Achieving Cocaine Abstinence with a Behavioral
Approach, 150 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 763, 769 (1993).
Mary E. MeCaul et al., Contingency Management Interventions: Effects on
Treatment Outcome During Methadone Detoxification, 17 J. APPLIED BEHAV.
ANALYSIS 35, 35-36 (1984).
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effective at improving adherence. 30 Recent work on
vaccinations against cocaine and methamphetamine addiction
31
similarly mentions the possibility of using a payment model.
3. Communicable Disease Treatment
Because patients infected with communicable diseases pose
risks of infection to others, treating them benefits society in
general as well as the infected individuals themselves.
However, treatments for some infections can either require a
long course of medication that can make adherence difficult or
require testing in patients who are asymptomatic and may not
perceive a need for testing. Financial incentives have been used
in several studies to encourage patients to adhere to treatment
protocols for infectious disease:
*

*

*
*
*

*

30
31

32

33

E.g., Higgins et al., A Behavioral Approach, supra note 28, at 1219.
Thomas Kosten et al., Vaccines Against Stimulants: Cocaine and MA, 77
BRIT. J. CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY 368, 372 (2013) (discussing "outpatient
contingency management, in which patients are paid to come for the
vaccinations with an escalating pay schedule for each vaccination obtained").
C. Kevin Malotte, Fen Rhodes & Kathleen E. Mais, Tuberculosis Screening
and Compliance with Return for Skin Test Reading Among Active Drug
Users, 88 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 792, 792 (1998).
Maxine L. Stitzer et al., Drug Users' Adherence to a 6-Month Vaccination
Protocol: Effects of Motivational Incentives, 107 DRUG & ALCOHOL
DEPENDENCE

34

35

36

Patients were paid to return and obtain their
tuberculosis skin test reading, where an incentive of
32
$10 dramatically increased rates of return;
Patients were paid to adhere to a vaccination
schedule for Hepatitis B that required seven
administrations, where a $10 incentive for each
session
attended
substantially
increased
33
adherence;
Patients were paid to receive influenza vaccinations,
34
increasing the rate of vaccination;
Patients were paid to attend tuberculosis follow-up
35
appointments, increasing adherence;
Injectable drug users were paid to attend education
about HIV prevention, which was found to be
effective, and more effective than nonmonetary
incentives; 36 and
Public health scholar and activist Paul Farmer used

76 (2010).

Mary Patricia Nowalk et al., Improving Influenza Vaccination Rates in the
Workplace: A Randomized Trial, 38 AM. J. PREVENTIVE MED. 237, 244 (2010).
Louise Pilote et al., Tuberculosis Prophylaxis in the Homeless: A Trial to
Improve Adherence to Referral, 156 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 161, 165 (1996).
Sherry Deren et al., The Impact of Providing Incentives for Attendance at
AIDS Prevention Sessions, 109 PUB.HEALTH REP. 548, 552 (1994).
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financial incentives to encourage treatment follow37
through among tuberculosis patients.
These interventions allow society to incentivize patients to
become non-infectious and to lower their odds of infecting
others, benefitting both the patients and society in general.
4. Other Examples
In some cases, payment for adherence can serve a similar
function to payment for cost-effectiveness. Phototherapy
(ultraviolet light treatment) for psoriasis represents one
example. Even though phototherapy is safe, effective, and more
cost-effective than alternative treatments, patients tend not to
complete courses of phototherapy because these courses require
numerous sessions, each of which is inconvenient and requires
co-payment costs. A recent study suggests that a "'reverse' copayment (paying patients for sessions attended) of $10 per visit
for phototherapy and increased physician reimbursement of
$10 per treatment could encourage phototherapy utilization
and save thousands of dollars per patient in avoiding highercost pharmacologic interventions." 38 Just like the shared
savings proposal suggested by Schmidt and Emanuel, 39 paying
patients to receive phototherapy can enable insurers to achieve
net per-patient savings; to the extent that phototherapy is also
more absolutely effective than the alternatives, it can enable
patients to overcome their inconvenience-related aversion to it.
C. Paying for Cost-Effectiveness or Lower Cost
The economics of health care differ from the economics of
many other important goods, such as housing or food, in that
the individuals paying for the intervention frequently are not
the individuals who benefit. Many of the actors who bear some
of the cost of paying for health care interventions, such as
health insurers, employers, and governments, therefore have a
motivation to pay patients to select more cost-effective
treatments-or even treatments that are simply cheaper.
Allowing patients to receive a payment in exchange for waiving
their entitlement to costly medical interventions could leave
both patients and payers better off, since patients may value
the payment more than the intervention, while payers may
find it more affordable to pay patients to waive entitlements
31
38

Paul Farmer et al., Tuberculosis, Poverty, and "Compliance". Lessons from
Rural Haiti, 6 SEMINARS RESPIRATORY INFECTIONS 254, 256 (1991).
Gregory L. Simpson et al., Do Utilization Management Controls for
Phototherapy Increase the Prescriptionof Biologics?, 17 J. DERMATOLOGICAL
TREATMENT
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359, 360 (2006).

See infra notes 40-44 and accompanying text.
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than to provide interventions. These payments often do not
constitute Pareto-efficient improvements, in which some people
are made better off and none are made worse off, because they
deprive producers and providers-such as physicians and drug
manufacturers-of profit opportunities. However, producers
and providers lack any obvious right to have patients purchase
what they sell at the current going price. Instead, payments
will put pressure on producers and providers to lower prices or
provide better-quality interventions.
Two recent proposals have made the case for paying
patients to decline expensive treatments in favor of selecting
alternatives that are more cost-effective or in favor of declining
treatment altogether. The first approach focuses on costeffectiveness, while the second focuses on cost alone.
Harald Schmidt and Ezekiel Emanuel develop the first
proposal, "inclusive shared savings," in a recent article in
JAMA Internal Medicine.40 Inclusive shared savings resembles
value-based insurance, which lowers or eliminates insurance
out-of-pocket costs for patients who elect to use more costeffective interventions. However, it goes beyond value-based
insurance's elimination of out-of-pocket costs to affirmatively
pay patients in exchange for their selecting cost-effective
treatments. They describe inclusive shared savings using the
example of chemotherapies for gastric cancer:
[U]nder inclusive shared savings the oncologist
would tell the patient about the therapeutically
equivalent chemotherapies for advanced gastric
cancer. If the patient selected the least expensive
treatment, the co-payments would be eliminated
and the patient would also receive a payment. If
the patient chose a more costly treatment, the
payment would decrease. There would be no
financial incentive to choose the most expensive
option. A specific formula for determining the
patient's payment would have to be developed.
For example, the payment might be a percentage
based on the actual reduction in total cost of
care. The amounts of the payments should be
sufficiently large that they would be meaningful
to patients while still contributing to substantial
41
overall cost reductions.
Schmidt and Emanuel identify existing precedents for inclusive
40

41

Harald Schmidt & Ezekiel J. Emanuel, Lowering Medical Costs Through the
Sharing of Savings by Physicians and Patients: Inclusive Shared Savings,
174 JAMA INTERNAL MED. 2009, 2009 (2014).
Id. at 2012.
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shared savings, including practices outside of medicine ("some
hotels provide guests with a $5 voucher for every day that they
forego housekeeping services" 42), as well as a current example
from the Medicare system:
In health care, Medicare's acute care episode
demonstration project provides a bundled
payment to physicians and hospitals for 37
orthopedic and cardiac procedures, such as hip
replacements. Patients' co-payments are waived,
and patients are offered a $275 incentive for
receiving
their
treatment
through
the
43
demonstration.
Schmidt and Emanuel then argue for inclusive shared savings
on the basis that it more fairly distributes the savings from
reducing the cost of care, incentivizes patients more powerfully
than the mere elimination of copayments, and encourages
shared decision making. (In earlier work, Richard Saver
similarly proposes that the expansion of "gainsharing"
programs, in which insurers and providers share the benefits of
more cost-effective health care delivery, should include patients
in gainsharing as well. 44) Inclusive shared savings could be
adopted directly by private insurers or employers, but could
also be proposed by governments or non-governmental
organizations. As Emanuel and Schmidt indicate, the amount
of the payment could be calibrated to the change in the cost of
care, to the improvement in cost-effectiveness, or to some other
metric.
Christopher Robertson has made a similar but simpler
proposal, which focuses only on cost rather than costeffectiveness. Robertson proposes the "split benefit," a model
under which insurers pay patients some fraction of the price of
a costly intervention they are entitled to receive, and the
patient then gets to decide whether to choose the costly
intervention-turning over that fraction as a copayment-or
45
instead to retain the fraction and go without the intervention.
Robertson and co-authors have examined the potential efficacy
of the split benefit in an empirical study and have argued that
many patients would select the money rather than the
intervention. 46 Prior to Robertson's work, two economists
42

43
44

45
46

Id.
Id.
Richard S. Saver, Squandering the Gain: Garnishing and the Continuing
Dilemma of Physician Financial Incentives, 98 Nw. U. L. REV. 145, 228-31
(2003).
Christopher Robertson, The Split Benefit: The Painless Way to Put Skin Back
in the Health Care Game, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 921, 944-46 (2013).
Christopher T. Robertson et al., A Randomized Experiment of the Split
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similarly suggested that patients be able to waive their right to
certain expensive end-of-life treatments in exchange for
47
payments.
The split-benefit structure allows patients to decline
expensive care when they would prefer to have the money
instead-like inclusive shared savings, it pays patients to
decline treatments that are expensive, but to which they would
otherwise be entitled. However, unlike inclusive shared
savings, it does not focus specifically on cost-effectiveness,
because the payment to the patient reflects the absolute cost of
the intervention rather than the cost-effectiveness of the
cheaper alternative. In some circumstances, the split benefit
could lead to patients selecting a cheaper but less cost-effective
treatment, or turning down treatments that are cost-saving for
society overall, in order to receive more money.
D. Paying for Health Decisions and Outcomes
1. Paying for Health Improvement
Many organizations who pay for patient care costs, such as
employers, insurers, and even governments, have instituted
workplace wellness programs that use what some have called
"Pay for Performance for Patients."48 These programs include
monetary incentives for certain behaviors, such as weight loss,
smoking cessation, or participation in various wellness
programs, or to reach certain biomedical targets such as body
mass index or blood pressure levels. Some of these incentive
programs, such as those for smoking cessation, overlap with
the adherence programs discussed in the prior Section, but
many extend to cover not only adherence but also the
achievement of health outcomes.
These programs have produced substantial discussion, and
the Affordable Care Act codified permission for employers to
Benefit

Health Insurance Reform

to

Reduce

Consumption, 1 INNOVATION &ENTREPRENEURSHIP
47

48

High-Cost, Low-Value

HEALTH 5, 5-6

(2014).

Margaret M. Byrne & Peter Thompson, Death and Dignity: Terminal Illness
and the Market for Non-Treatment, 76 J. PuB. ECON. 263, 277 (2000); cf.
Corey J. Ayling, New Developments in ERISA Preemption and Judicial
Oversight of Managed Care, 31 CREIGHTON L. REV. 403, 405 n.14 (1998)
("Perhaps ... the patient should be given year-end bonuses for limiting her
health care or for avoiding disfavored and expensive treatments like
cardiology care ....
It may well be far more efficient to turn doctors into
salaried advisors and to pay patients significant bonuses for using health
services sparingly. This system has yet to evolve, perhaps because of the fear
of encouraging foolish, short-term decision making by patients or perhaps
because of the fundamental principle of insurance that the well subsidize the
sick.").
Judith A. Long, Marie Helweg-Larsen & Kevin G. Volpp, Patient Opinions
Regarding 'Payfor Performancefor Patients,' 23 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 1647

(2008).
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engage in them. 49 One distinction drawn in the literature
contrasts interventions that pay for effort toward health
improvement with those that pay for the achievement of health
outcomes, although the ethical relevance of this distinction is
50
debatable.
2. Paying for Other Health Choices
In some cases, individuals are paid to make health-related
choices that do not straightforwardly improve their own health,
but instead advance the interests (both health-related and
otherwise) of society or of specific third parties.
Individuals are frequently paid to take health risks. Certain
jobs-ranging from football to nuclear waste disposal to
infectious disease nursing-involve employees being paid to
engage in activities that put their health at risk. Two contexts
where individuals are paid as part of an agreement that
involves taking on health risks have received particular
attention: (1) clinical research on human subjects 5 1 and (2)
organ and tissue donation. 52
Another common context featuring proposals to pay
patients involves the exercise of reproductive capacities. One
financial incentive that has engendered substantial discussion
is the "dollar a day" proposal advanced by Sunstein and Thaler.
This is a program in which teenagers are paid one dollar per
day to avoid becoming pregnant. 53 (It is unclear whether the
49

50

See generally Kristin M. Madison, Kevin G. Volpp & Scott D. Halpern, The
Law, Policy, and Ethics of Employers' Use of FinancialIncentives to Improve
Health, 39 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 450 (2011) (providing a comprehensive review
of financial incentive use in the employment context that touches on legal,
ethical, and economic dimensions of incentives).
Harald Schmidt, David A. Asch & Scott D. Halpern, Fairness and Wellness
Incentives: What is the Relevance of the Process-Outcome Distinction?, 55
PREVENTIVE MED. S118 (2012).

51 For perspectives friendly to payment, see generally Christine Grady,
Payment of Clinical Research Subjects, 115 J. CLINICAL INVESTIGATION 1681
(2005); Scott D. Halpern, Financial Incentives for Research Participation:
Empirical Questions, Available Answers and the Burden of FurtherProof, 342
AM. J. MED. Sci. 290 (2011); and Alan Wertheimer & Franklin G. Miller,
Payment for Research Participation:A Coercive Offer?, 34 J. MED. ETHICS 389
(2008). For more skeptical perspectives, see generally Carl Elliott & Roberto
Abadie, Exploiting a Research Underclass in Phase 1 Clinical Trials, 358
NEW ENGL. J. MED. 2316 (2008); Ruth Macklin, The Paradoxical Case of
Payment as Benefit to Research Subjects, 11 IRB: ETHICS & HUM. RES. 1
(1989); and Janice C. Wong & Mark Bernstein, Payment of Research Subjects
for More than Minimal Risk Trials Is Unethical, 342 AM. J. MED. SCI. 294
(2011).
52 Compare Francis L. Delmonico et al., Ethical Incentives Not Payment for
Organ Donation, 346 NEw ENGL. J. MED 2002 (2002), with JANET RADCLIFFE
RICHARDS, THE ETHICS OF TRANSPLANTS: WHY CARELESS THOUGHT COSTS LIVES

(2012).
53
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program worked.54) Other organizations have offered to pay
women who agree to long-term sterilization. 55 On the other
side, some have proposed paying women not to choose
abortions.56
An interesting hypothetical would involve the parents of
children with disabilities paying prospective parents who
choose to have children with similar disabilities. Individuals
with a given disability may derive benefits from there being a
57
larger community of individuals with the same disability.
Though these discussions do not typically use this terminology,
the benefits are positive "network externalities" for the existing
families, just as the preservation of a spoken language or a
media format is a positive network externality for those who
speak that language or use that media format. The existence of
this positive externality makes it economically sensible to pay
individuals to provide it, though not necessarily ethically
sensible for there to be a regime of such payments.

II. PAYING PATIENTS: ETHICAL ISSUES
Many of the legal issues raised by payments to patients,
which I will discuss in Part IV, are intertwined with normative
issues. Understanding what sorts of contracts are against
public policy, or what types of discrimination are objectionable,
requires
examining normative
concepts.
Furthermore,
normative issues are of interest both as we consider what the
legal landscape should be like-as opposed to what it is likeand as we consider non-legal questions such as what
professional obligations providers might owe to patients.

HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS

234 (2008).

Gerd Gigerenzer, On the Supposed Evidence for LibertarianPaternalism, 6
REV. PHIL. &PSYCH. 361, 363 n.1 (2015); Catherine Stevens-Simon et al., The
Effect of Monetary Incentives and Peer Support Groups on Repeat Adolescent
Pregnancies: A Randomized Trial of the Dollar-a-Day Program, 277 JAMA
977, 981 (1997).
55 See Govind Persad, Libertarian Patriarchalism: Nudges, Procedural
Roadblocks, and Reproductive Choice, 35 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 273, 283
54

(2013).
56
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Stephen G. Gilles, Should PregnancyHelp Centers Offer Post-NatalFinancial
Support to Reduce the Incidence of Abortion?, 13 AVE MARIA L. REV. 21, 23
(2015); Jennifer Graham, Meet the Retired Nurse Who Pays Women Not To
Have
Abortions,
DESERET
NEWS
(June
24,
2016),
http://www.deseretnews.com/article/865656672/Meet-the-retired-nurse-whopays-women-not-to-have-abortions.html [http://perma.cc/M78U-LUSA].
E.g., Amy Harmon, Prenatal Test Puts Down Syndrome in Hard Focus, N.Y.
TIMES (May 9, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/09/us/O9down.html
[http://perma.cc/8WN5-AMJP] ("'If all these people terminate babies with
Down syndrome, there won't be programs, there won't be acceptance or
tolerance,' said Tracy Brown, 37, of Seattle, whose 2-year-old son, Maxford,
has the condition. 'I want opportunities for my son. I don't know if that's right
or wrong, but I do."').
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There are few comprehensive reviews of the ethical issues
associated with payments to patients. Some authors have
examined the ethical issues raised by market transactions or
market incentives in general, 58 and others have looked at the
ethical issues raised by specific types of payments, such as
wellness programs offered by insurers. 59 This Section provides
a more coherent and comprehensive review of ethical concerns
that creates a taxonomy for the ethical concerns that payments
to patients raise; provides an evaluation of how compelling
those concerns should be; and identifies directions for future
empirical and conceptual research.
A. Concerns About Deliberative Autonomy
One family of ethical concerns about payments to patients
focuses on ways in which payments might interfere with
patients' capacity to deliberate effectively about their medical
options and interests. Examples of such interference include
coercion, undue inducement, and what I call "deliberative
diversion." I argue that payments do not coerce, and that
whether they constitute undue inducements is largely an
empirical question. The most compelling arguments involve
deliberative diversion, but deliberative diversion may not be
sufficiently objectionable to justify a prohibition on payments.
1. Coercion
Promberger et al. report that "even if effective, offering
financial incentives to motivate health-enhancing behavior
attracts opprobrium in lay and professional media." 60 This
opprobrium stems in part, they contend, from the belief that
such incentives are coercive.
Whether payments are coercive depends on what account of
coercion we adopt. One plausible account is that an individual
is coerced to do X if and only if she is threatened with being
made worse off than she has a right to be unless she does X.6 1
Alan Wertheimer and Franklin Miller argue that payments to
patients in research are not coercive under this definition

58

See, e.g., ELIZABETH ANDERSON, VALUE IN ETHICS AND ECONOMICS (1995);
JASON F. BRENNAN & PETER JAWORSKI, MARKETS WITHOUT LIMITS: MORAL
VIRTUES AND COMMERCIAL INTERESTS (2015); RUTH W. GRANT, STRINGS
ATTACHED: UNTANGLING THE ETHICS OF INCENTIVES (2011); DEBRA SATZ, WHY
SOME THINGS SHOULD NOT BE FOR SALE: THE MORAL LIMITS OF MARKETS

59
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(2010).
E.g., Harald Schmidt, Bonuses as Incentives and Rewards for Health
Responsibility: A Good Thing?, 33 J. MED. & PHIL. 198, 208-09 (2008).
Marianne Promberger et al., Acceptability of FinancialIncentives to Improve
Health Outcomes in UK and US Samples, 37 J. MED. ETHICS 682, 682 (2011).
Wertheimer & Miller, supra note 51, at 390.
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because they do not threaten to make patients worse off than
they have a right to be: they are offers, not threats.6 2 While
there may be other reasons for concern about such payments,
they do not coerce. Though they focus on clinical research,
Wertheimer and Miller's argument extends to payments to
patients more broadly: patients are not deprived of anything to
which they have a right when they are offered payment, and
therefore are not coerced. So, for instance, participants in an
inclusive shared-savings program or in a smoking-cessation
program are not coerced when they are offered money if they
choose cost-effective interventions or take steps to cease
smoking.
The most promising objection to the claim that payments
never coerce argues that payments can be coercive when (1) the
recipient of the offer is facing very bad circumstances and (2)
the offer is very attractive in light of those circumstances,
although the recipient's situation after accepting the offer will
still be a bad one. An example is Joel Feinberg's "lecherous
millionaire" example, in which a millionaire offers a woman
with a dying child treatment for her child in exchange for her
becoming the millionaire's mistress.6 3 The objection, however,
fails because it conflates exploitation with coercion. While the
lecherous millionaire's offer may be objectionable, it is not
coercive, because the offer itself does not make the offeree
worse off than she has a right to be. Rather, the offer proposes
to take advantage of the offeree's vulnerability, and therefore
may be exploitative (and therefore morally wrong all the
64
same).
Offers of payment may be coercive if we accept some other
account of coercion. However, Wertheimer's account-or some
similar account that defines coercion in terms of wrongful
threats-is the most plausible one available. Defining coercion
in terms of interests rather than rights (as in threatening to
make someone worse off than they prefer to be) classifies far
too many cases as coercive, while defining coercion
counterfactually (as in threatening to make someone worse off
than they would otherwise be) classifies too few cases as
65
coercive.

62

Id. at 391.
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John McMillan, Coercive Offers and Research Participation:A Comment on
Wertheimer and Miller, 36 J. MED. ETHICS 383, 384 (2010) (citing JOEL
FEINBERG, HARM TO SELF (1986)).
On exploitation, see infra Section I.B. 1.
Scott Anderson, Coercion, in THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY
(Edward
N.
Zalta
ed.
2015),
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2015/entries/coercion/
[http://perma.cc/GZ6F-9VAX].
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2. Undue Inducement
Some offers of payment to patients may be undue
inducements in that they impair patients' capacity to deliberate
rationally about what medical decisions to make. The definition
of undue inducement, however, is debated. One definition of
undue inducement, adopted by the Council for International
Organizations of Medical Sciences (CIOMS) in its Guideline 7
for clinical research and defended by Ezekiel Emanuel, sees
undue inducements as payments that produce deliberative
misjudgments:
Payment in money or in kind to research subjects
should not be so large as to persuade them to
take undue risks or volunteer against their
better judgment. Payments or rewards that
undermine a person's capacity to exercise free
choice invalidate consent.6 6
Emanuel et al. suggest that undue inducements must meet
four criteria:
1) an offered good-individuals are offered
something that is valuable or desirable in
order to do something;
2) excessive offer-the offered good must be so
large or in excess that it is irresistible in the
context;
3) poor judgment-the offer leads individuals to
exercise poor judgment in an important
decision;
4) risk of serious harm-the individuals' poor
judgment leads to sufficiently high chance
that they will experience a harm that
67
seriously contravenes his or her interests.
Other authors have offered similar criteria that emphasize that
an inducement must have a psychologically distorting effect in
order to be undue, such that the individual, if deliberating
coolly and in light of her considered commitments, would not
66
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Ezekiel J. Emanuel, Xolani E. Currie & Allen Herman, Undue Inducement in
Clinical Research in Developing Countries: Is It a Worry?, 366 LANCET 336,
337 (2005).
Id. Angela Ballantyne similarly observes that "[i]nducement payments for
research subjects are thought to be 'undue' when they distort the judgement
of potential research subjects and undermine the voluntariness of the
subject's consent." Angela Ballantyne, Benefits to Research Subjects in
International Trials: Do They Reduce Exploitation or Increase Undue
Inducement?, 8 DEVELOPING WORLD BIOETHICS 178, 184 (2008).
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accept the inducement. 8 A study by Largent et al. indicates
that institutional review board members reviewing clinical
research protocols agree that "an offer constitutes undue
influence if it 'distorts a subject's ability to perceive accurately
the risks and benefits of research."'6 9
The question that this definition raises is when, if ever,
offers of money genuinely do distort patients' ability to perceive
risks and benefits. Empirical studies in the research-ethics
context suggest that prospective subjects do not believe that
offers of money genuinely distort risk/benefit perception; if
subjects are correct, few payments would constitute undue
inducements in CIOMS's sense.7 0 This perception finds some
support from work that concludes that greater payments make
subjects, if anything, more vigilant about the possibility of
harm. 71 It would be valuable to conduct similar studies for
payments to patients outside the research-ethics context, such
as inclusive-shared-savings payments or payments for
adherence.
A different definition of undue inducement regards an
inducement as undue when it is highly deliberatively
significant, even when the patient's deliberation is undistorted.
There are at least two potential standards for deliberative
significance. One is the view that a financial inducement is
undue whenever it leads a patient to do something she
otherwise would not have done. One empirical survey found
that eighty percent of respondents believed that, in the
research context, an "offer of payment constitutes undue
influence simply because it motivates someone to do something
they otherwise would not." 72 This view, however, generates an
overbroad definition of undue inducement on which any
successful payment incentive would be unduly influential,
because it succeeds in getting people to do something they
would not do sans incentive. Many payments in daily life would
also be unduly influential-for instance, I unduly influence
someone to mow my lawn if she would not have done so unpaid.
68

69

70
71
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See Wertheimer & Miller, supra note 51, at 391 ("[An inducement is undue
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Populations,33 J. MED. ETHICS 382, 383 (2007) ("To avoid confusion, we use
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Emily A. Largent et al., Money, Coercion, and Undue Inducement: A Survey of
Attitudes About Payments to Research Participants,34 IRB 1, 6 (2012).
David Casarett, Jason Karlawish & David A. Asch, Paying Hypertension
Research Subjects, 17 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 651, 653 (2002).
Cynthia E. Cryder et al., Informative Inducement: Study Payment as a Signal
of Risk, 70 SOC. SCI. MED. 455, 460 (2010).
Largent et al, supra note 69, at 6.

199

THE YALE JOURNAL OF LAW & TECHNOLOGY

Vol. 20

The other potential standard for deliberative significance is the
view that a financial inducement is undue whenever it leads a
patient to do something she would otherwise have strongly
rejected (i.e., whenever the inducement is so large that its
value overwhelms any concerns the patient might have). This
is somewhat more plausible, though in the end it is more
properly classified as a concern about deliberative diversion,
discussed next. But very few financial inducements are large
enough to produce this scenario.
Many examples leave it unclear how undue inducement is
being defined. Tom Beauchamp and Ruth Faden, for instance,
offer the following example:
Researchers offer Mary $25 per day in exchange
for her participation in research involving
repeated,
"painful and
invasive
medical
procedures." Mary is terrified of participating in
the research, but badly needs money. "Mary
wishes desperately that she had never received
such an offer because once it is made, she feels
she must accept, whereas beforehand she would
never have been faced with such a tragic
73
'choice."'
It is unclear why Mary prefers not to have received the offer.
One possibility is that the offer distorts her deliberative
capacities such that she feels psychologically compelled to
agree even though her considered judgment would reject the
offer-the offer is analogous to offering a drink to an alcoholic.
But if Mary's considered judgment is that she would prefer to
receive $25, even for the terrifying research, than not to
participate, then it is not clear why the inducement is undue. It
may be exploitative or otherwise unjust, but the problem does
not lie in its effects on Mary's deliberation.
3. Deliberative Diversion and Deliberative Insulation
Discussions of both coercion and undue inducement,
particularly by authors who attempt to justify expansive
understandings of those concepts, suggest that the concern at
issue is not truly about deliberative distortion or about
individuals being left without choices. Rather, the concernone that has not so far been well defined in the literatureinvolves the value to patients of being able to deliberate in a
way that is insulated from financial considerations, which
Matt Lamkin, Health Care Reform, Wellness Programs and the Erosion of
Informed Consent, 101 KY. L.J. 435, 447 (quoting RUTH R. FADEN & TOM L.
BEAUCHAMP, A HISTORY AND THEORY OF INFORMED CONSENT 358-59 (1986)).
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paying patients to make decisions undermines. This is a
conceptual rather than empirical point: the claim is not that
patients' deliberation is actually made worse, but instead that
the meaning of the deliberation is changed by the presence of
financial considerations.
The legal scholar Seana Shiffrin offers a detailed
explanation of what I call "deliberative insulation" in her
discussion of the value of subsidizing certain individual choices,
including choices to make certain health-jeopardizing decisions
such as smoking:
Accommodation restricts the sorts of reasons the
agent and those who interact with her must
consider. To varying degrees, creating insulated
areas allows an agent to focus on some of the
distinctive reasons associated with the activity.
It protects her from worrying about certain goods
and reasons only contingently or indirectly
associated with the activity. Our medical
premium and privacy practices permit a person
to evaluate whether to smoke by considering the
reasons closely associated with the activity: the
social and sensory pleasures (and costs) and the
health risks, without having the deliberation
salted by other sorts of reasons presented by the
threats of job loss, severe income fluctuation,
deprivation of health care, and social ostracism.
Such other reasons may tend to dominate and
overshadow those reasons associated with the
74
activity itself.
Shiffrin goes on to further explain the value of being able to
focus narrowly on a more limited set of considerations:
This sort of focus is valuable partly because it
helps to facilitate the agent's integrity-some
sorts of decisions are highly delicate and agents
are prone to distraction and temptation. But
more than that, it promotes a certain sort of
freedom. It allows an agent to respond to a
certain range of reasons that might otherwise be
dominated by considerations relating to others,
by morality, or by physical and financial need; in
so doing, it permits her the chance to exercise a
particular aspect of her capacity for choice. This
permits her to exercise a certain range of
74

Seana Valentine Shiffrin, Paternalism, Unconscionability Doctrine, and
Accommodation, 29 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 205, 239-41 (2000).
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capacities for choice without having to exercise
others. The smoker may, in some (quite limited)
sphere, exercise her capacities for making choices
about her body and her physical experiences,
without also having to engage her capacities for
moral deliberation or prudential financial
planning. Even a very limited and constricted
opportunity to respond to certain sorts of
important reasons and to exercise certain
capacities for choice in ways that are not fully
dominated by other considerations seems like a
part of autonomy's value that is worth
75
protecting.
Shiffrin's discussion is focused on the subsidization of behavior
(the elimination of financial penalties), but it also seems
applicable to the limitation or elimination of financial
incentives. By enrolling in a smoking cessation study that pays
her for each day she avoids smoking, a smoker may improve
her odds of quitting, but she allows considerations about
financial planning to seep into her judgment about whether to
smoke-her deliberation is, as Shiffrin puts it, "salted" by those
considerations and diverted from a narrower focus.
For those who find Shiffrin's smoker example too
stylized, consider a different case. Imagine that as you were
considering whether to propose to your spouse, your in-laws
had offered you a sizable sum of money to do so in view of their
desire for grandchildren. Even though you might normally be
happy to receive a financial incentive to do something you
would have liked to do anyway-imagine finding out that your
favorite brand of cereal comes with a cash-back rebate-the
intrusion of these financial considerations into your decision
about whether to propose could be unwelcome. It would make it
more difficult to conclude reflectively that you decided to
propose out of love, rather than for some other reason.
Somewhat further afield, Kimberly Yuracko argues that
working in "sex-plus" jobs, which involve both the sale of sexual
arousal and of some other good, can produce deliberative and
role confusion:

"A clearly problematic job ...

is one that

requires a woman to work as a chemistry professor from nine
to five and then perform a striptease for the administrative
staff at five every afternoon." T She concludes that there is
value to protecting "women's ability to develop as intellectual
and rational actors by carving out a space for them in the work
world where they cannot be formally and explicitly
75
76

Id. at 247-48.
Kimberly A. Yuracko, Private Nurses and Playboy Bunnies: Explaining
Permissible Sex Discrimination,92 CAL. L. REV. 147, 203-04 (2004).
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sexualized." 77 Having to consider both financial and health
considerations may create similar forms of role confusion, and
there may be distinctive value in being able to focus on only
one.
Some criticisms of payments to patients, even if presented
in the language of undue inducement or coercion, are most
charitably understood as referencing an ideal of deliberative
insulation along the lines defended by Shiffrin and Yuracko.
These criticisms generally make the case that patients should
make decisions about research participation by focusing on the
effects participation will have on their own health and on the
public good, but-importantly-not on how participation will
affect financial well-being. Alex John London develops what I
take to be a paradigm case of a deliberative-insulation account.
London observes that "the reasons that individuals choose to
participate as participants in scientific research matter" and
that we want individual participation to be motivated by
medical or altruistic reasons rather than financial ones:
[W]e want to ensure that participants are not
induced to participate in research in which they
would not participate if they were to evaluate it
solely in terms of its potential for direct personal
benefit (as opposed to indirect benefits deriving
from incentives to participate) or in terms of its
merits as a means by which they might
78
contribute to the fund of human knowledge.
London concludes that the permissibility of research
participation should hinge on "whether the trial participants
themselves view the research as a worthwhile means of
advancing their own interest in benefiting directly from the
research activity or as advancing their own interest in
contributing to the common good through research
participation. 79 Even though London describes his view as a
definition of undue inducement, I would classify it as one that
insists on the importance of deliberative insulation. Jeanne
Sears similarly endorses the view that "[i]deally, a decision
about whether or not to volunteer for research should reflect
the values of the individual concerned and nothing else."80 In
77
78

79
80

Id. at 202.
Alex John London, Undue Inducements and Reasonable Risks: Will the
Dismal Science Lead to Dismal Research Ethics?, 5 AM. J. BIOETHICS 29, 3132 (2005).
Id. at 32.
Jeanne M. Sears, Payment of Research Subjects: A BroaderPerspective, 1 AM.
J. BIOETHICS 66, 67 (2001); cf. Christine Grady, Money for Research
Participation:Does It Jeopardize Informed Consent?, 1 AM. J. BIOETHICS 40,
42 (2001) ("It is sometimes argued that since research participants volunteer
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the egg-donation context, one commentator discusses similar
concerns that "[p]ayment threatens to compromise the 'good'
motivation of desiring to help with the taint of the 'bad'
motivation of desiring to make money." 8 1 Other criticisms of
payment incentives in the research context similarly reference
the importance of patients selecting trial participation "for the
82
right reasons."
Deliberative diversion identifies a genuinely important
reason to be concerned about paying patients. Whether it
justifies a prohibition on payments, however, is less clear.
First, financial motivations can coexist with non-financial ones,
so even if financial motivations do intrude on deliberations,
they need not swamp all other motivations. Second,
deliberative insulation, even if desirable, may not be
sufficiently important to justify prohibiting payment. Laura
Siminoff argues that
[t]he ethical duty of the research community is
not to be "thought police" guarding against
subjects' making decisions for "wrong" reasons,
but to assure that the research we are asking
subjects to consider participating in is not so
onerous or so dangerous that participation would
83
seriously threaten their health and safety.
Siminoffs argument is somewhat uncharitable, since the goal

81

82

83

with altruistic motives of contributing to science and society, money has no
place in this arrangement. The ethical concern, then, is not simply that some
might find the offer of money irresistible, but also that money is simply an
inappropriate motivating factor for research participation.").
Charis Thompson, Why We Should, in Fact, Pay for Egg Donation, 2
REGENERATIVE MED. 203, 205 (2007).
Benjamin Hale, Risk, Judgment and Fairnessin Research Incentives, 7 AM. J.
BIOETHICS 82, 83 (2007); see also Lainie Friedman Ross, Payment in Pediatric
Research, 9 J. MED. & L. 1, 1 (2005) ("Ideally, research subjects would be
motivated by idealism and altruism, by which I mean that they would share
in, support, and be motivated by the goals of the researchers."); Wertheimer
& Miller, supra note 51, at 389 (speculating that some object to payment in
research because "it will wrongly commodify a practice that should be based
on altruism"). In a seminal article on payment incentives, Ruth Grant and
Jeremy Sugarman also observe that "[it is important to do some things for
the right reasons, and money is not always one of those reasons." Ruth W.
Grant & Jeremy Sugarman, Ethics in Human Subjects Research: Do
Incentives Matter?, 29 J. MED. & PHIL. 717, 728 (2004). However, Grant and
Sugarman see payment incentives as potentially troubling not because they
destroy deliberative insulation, but instead because they may lead to certain
bad consequences, such as harms to child welfare, the degrading treatment of
individuals, and the loss of "collective respect for personal dignity in the
nature." Id. at 730. Because this objection focuses on consequences rather
than a conceptual connection, its validity is empirically testable.
Laura A. Siminoff, Money and the Research Subject: A Comment on Grady, 1
AM. J. BIOETHICS 65, 66 (2001).
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of prohibiting payments need not be to paternalistically protect
patients who want payments from deciding for the wrong
reasons, but rather to protect patients who want deliberative
insulation from being confronted with financial motivations.
Nonetheless, her objection-understood as making the case
that concerns about deliberative diversion simply are not
important enough to justify prohibitions on payment-has
force.

B. Other Patient-Focused Concerns
1. Exploitation
There is an ample literature on exploitation in healthrelated financial transactions, much of which comes from the
literature on clinical research ethics. Unlike the concerns
discussed in the previous Section, exploitation concerns are not
about problems with the payment recipient's deliberation, but
instead about an unfair distribution of the gains from a
transaction. If an insurer pays a patient a small sum to select a
cheaper treatment and profits enormously from the patient's
choice, the payment may appear to constitute exploitation. This
judgment can be intensified if the insurer's ability to profit is
contingent on the patient's vulnerability-for instance, if the
insurer is able to persuade the patient using only a small sum
because the patient is very badly off financially. As Alan
Wertheimer observes, exploitation can be mutually beneficial
in comparison to no interaction at all: In the above example,
the impoverished patient and the insurer both gain from the
transaction, even though the patient gains much less. 8 4 For this
reason, exploitation is also distinct from coercion.
The fundamental challenge for exploitation arguments is to
identify the criteria for non-exploitative transactions. Equal
division of the social surplus from an interaction is not
compelling, because many non- exploitative exchanges (for
instance, paying a low price for a life-saving antibiotic) do not
divide the surplus from the exchange equally: Instead, a large
amount of the surplus from the trade goes to one side. 85
Another criterion, that neither party profits from the other's
vulnerability, is also not compelling-many health professions
would not be profitable, or indeed financially tenable, if people
were invulnerable to ill health. It is more compelling to argue
that no one should profit unfairly from another's vulnerability,
84

ALAN WERTHEIMER, RETHINKING THE ETHICS OF CLINICAL RESEARCH: WIDENING

201 (2010).
Zwolinski & Alan Wertheimer, Exploitation, in THE STANFORD
ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF
PHILOSOPHY
(Edward
N.
Zalta
ed.),
http://plato. stanford. edu/archives/fall2016/entries/exploitation/
[http://perma.ce/UJP4-VLYK].
THE LENS

85

Matt

205

THE YALE JOURNAL OF LAW

& TECHNOLOGY

Vol. 20

but this returns us to the question of which profits are unfair.
Wertheimer suggested that a hypothetically fair market is one
sort of baseline, though it can be difficult to conceive of what a
86
hypothetically fair market would be for some sorts of goods.
Meanwhile, Matt Zwolinski has suggested a theory where
mutually advantageous and consensual transactions should not
be prohibited, regardless of how vulnerable any participant is
or how the surplus from the transaction is divided. 87
Zwolinski's view of exploitation faces two objections. First,
sometimes a transaction generates a relationship that produces
new, non-waivable rights. For instance, even if A prefers to
marry B under terms that require A to agree to a very unequal
share of the benefits of marriage than not to marry B at all, it
may still be disallowed for B to marry A under those terms
because marriage generates a right to a fair share of marital
benefits. 88 Even though this non-waivable entitlement leaves A
worse off, it may simply be a feature of certain relationships.
Second, sometimes the alternative to unequal division of
benefits is not the absence of a transaction, but rather a
transaction on more equal terms. Under these circumstances, it
may be appropriate to prohibit or regulate transactions in
order to encourage more equal transactions. Alex John London
makes this argument regarding research ethics: If clinical
trials are geographically mobile, while potential beneficiaries
are not, trials can place the beneficiaries in an "auction" where
the benefits are bid down to the minimum level required for the
transaction to be mutually advantageous. By requiring a
minimum level of benefit, an equilibrium may be reached that
is better for all beneficiaries. 89 Determining whether this
objection applies will require both an empirical analysis of the
benefits of regulation or prohibition and a conceptual analysis
of whether the beneficiaries are entitled to that benefit.
In the end, exploitation considerations rarely justify
prohibitions on paying patients. Under some circumstances,
they justify prohibiting both the payment and the arrangement
paid for entirely (as in the marriage case); but more often, they
require only that patients be paid a minimum amount or that
payments be regulated in some other way.
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supra note 84, at 209.
Matt Zwolinski, The Ethics of Price Gouging, 18 Bus. ETHICS Q. 347, 357
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ALAN WERTHEIMER, EXPLOITATION 291 (1999).
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Alex John London & Kevin J.S. Zollman, Research at the Auction Block, 40
HASTINGS CTR. REP. 34 (2010); see also Efthymios Athanasiou, Alex John
London & Kevin J.S. Zollman, Dignity and the Value of Rejecting Profitable
but Insulting Offers, 124 MIND 409, 442-43 (2015) (describing a situation in
which beneficiaries prefer to coordinate in order to avoid being faced with
exploitative offers).
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2. Disrespect
Some offers of payment to patients may be criticized on the
grounds that they communicate disrespect or insult. They may
communicate disrespect because they suggest a paternalistic
motivation on the part of the payer-that the payer is paying
the patient to achieve an outcome because she believes she
knows better than the payer what is good for her. 90 Along
similar lines, they may communicate disrespect because they
suggest a failure to take the patient's commitments seriously.
If a patient refuses to accept a prescription for a more costeffective treatment, following up that refusal with an offer to
pay the patient to use the more cost-effective option may seem
disrespectful of the patient's stated values. 91 Neal Dickert
provides an example: "Offering $50,000 to a Jehovah's Witness
to participate in a trial of a new blood product may not
compromise autonomy or corrupt judgment, but it fails to
recognize 92a constraint placed on the offerer by the values of the
'offeree."' In response to concerns that Jehovah's Witnesses
should be provided the opportunity to weigh their financial
interests against their religious values, Dickert observes that
not to recognize that some offers are better not
made, or that there are positions that persons
would rather avoid based on their values (even if
they may choose to take the offer if presented),
seems simplistic. Due to the depth and nature of
certain values, some offers can become indecent
and disrespectful, and restraint can be a form of
respecting holders of those values as autonomous
93
agents.
90

91

Scott D. Halpern, Kristin M. Madison & Kevin G. Volpp, Patients as
Mercenaries? The Ethics of Using Financial Incentives in the War on
Unhealthy Behaviors, 2 CIRCULATION 514, 515 (2009) ("Many people may be
uncomfortable with incentive programs because they inherently imply that..
* people are making bad decisions, and that governments or employers that
seek to change behaviors somehow know better."); Bernd Schubert & Rachel
Slater, Social Cash Transfers in Low-Income African Countries: Conditional
or Unconditional?,24 DEV. POLICY REV. 571, 576 (2006) ("Imposing conditions
on people may smack of top-down attitudes of 'we know better' and 'the poor
cannot be trusted"').
Neal W. Dickert, Re-Examining Respect for Human Research Participants,19
KENNEDY INST. ETHICS J. 311, 323 (2009) (suggesting that it is inappropriate
to use payment to "influence people to participate in research studies to
which it is known they would otherwise strongly object, based on important
values or preferences").
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Id.
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Id. at 324; see also Grant & Sugarman, supra note 82, at 728 ("To
deliberately induce religious people to work on the sabbath by offering large
incentives would involve an attempt to get them to act against what they see
as their duties; it would be a form of bribery.")
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Dickert's example seems correct: It would be disrespectful to
invite a nun to have sex, or to offer a rabbi thousands of dollars
to join you at a crawfish boil, even if it is in principle possible
that they would agree to the offer.
Offers of payment may also communicate disrespect
because they appeal purely to the patient's economic interest
and not to her other intellectual or rational faculties.
Presenting money to someone rather than trying to convince
her may appear to be a manipulative way of causing her to
make a decision. Or, they may communicate disrespect because
they leverage the payer's superior financial position, in the
same way that throwing money at someone to get them to do
something communicates disrespect.
Of course, what paying someone to do something expresses
is highly context sensitive. It is rude to tip your host for
cleaning up at a fancy dinner party to which you have been
invited, but rude not to tip your server in a fancy restaurant.
Accordingly, there is unlikely to be a general rule about when
payment to patients is disrespectful. The important thing to
remember is that patients are unlikely to be pure economic
maximizers: rather, they are likely to view offers of money as
appropriate in some contexts and inappropriate in others.
3. Discrimination
Jessica Roberts and Elizabeth Weeks Leonard have offered
one of the most detailed discussions of whether consideration of
health status is discriminatory. 94 Their article initially
identifies and brackets one answer to this question, namely
that consideration of health status can "exacerbate existing
inequalities based on other recognized categories," such as sex
or race. 95 They note that this strategy, adopted in Roberts' own
earlier work, does not answer the question of whether health
status is in itself an objectionable basis for advantages or
disadvantages:
Concluding that lifestyle discrimination, at least
with respect to nicotine use and obesity, is
normatively wrong primarily because it has a
disparate impact on historically disadvantaged
populations, does not require Roberts to
94

95

Jessica L. Roberts & Elizabeth Weeks Leonard, What Is (and Isn't)
Healthism, 50 GA. L. REV. 833, 844 (2015) (considering "when [it is]
normatively wrong to consider health status, and when [it is] normatively
acceptable-perhaps even desirable").
Id. at 852. I return below to the question of whether consideration of health
status is objectionable because it has a disparate impact on the
disadvantaged.
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recognize a new protected category for the
unhealthy. From this perspective, healthism is
simply a new form of discrimination against
already protected (to varying degrees of scrutiny)
groups. She does not actually have to decide
whether
health-status
discrimination
independently constitutes a normative wrong.
Instead, she can operate from the presumption
that racial,
ethnic, and other types
of
discrimination
are
wrong
and then
add
workplace policies against hiring nicotine users
and overweight individuals to the list of ways
that discrimination occurs. 96
Roberts and Leonard then attempt to evaluate the claim
that practices that treat individuals differently on the basis of
health status "constitute their own independent normative
wrong." 97 They
conclude
initially
that
the
major
antidiscrimination frameworks, in particular antisubordination
(which protects historically oppressed groups from further
disadvantage) and immutability (which regards unchangeable
characteristics as inappropriate bases for advantages and
disadvantages), do not obviously regard health status as an
inappropriate basis for advantages and disadvantages.
Individuals with specific health conditions are not necessarily a
historically oppressed group, and health-related conduct-as
well as health status-is not obviously immutable. In any
event, immutability is a normatively dubious basis for
regarding a characteristic as an inappropriate basis for a
disadvantage, because some mutable characteristics-such as
religion-are inappropriate bases for disadvantages, and some
immutable characteristics-such as date of birth-can be
appropriate bases for disadvantages.
However, Roberts and Leonard nonetheless conclude that
considering health status is normatively objectionable if it:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Is driven by animus,
Stigmatizes individuals unfairly,
Punishes people for their private conduct,
Impedes access to health care,
Cuts off resources or otherwise limits the ability to
adopt healthy life choices,
6. Produces worse health outcomes, or
98
7. Maintains or increases existing disparities.

96

97
98

Id. at 856.
Id.
Id. at 895.
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They conclude that "health-status distinctions that meet one or
more of these criteria ... call for legal or policy intervention." 99
The most compelling criterion Roberts and Leonard discuss
is animus. However, Roberts and Leonard define animus as
"dislike or hostility towards the protected class of which that
person is a member." 100 This definition is circular, because
whether health status is a protected category is the very fact
we are trying to determine. Second, dislike or hostility toward
a class as such is not invariably objectionable-it is morally
acceptable, and perhaps laudable, to dislike the "class of
thieves" or the "class of bigots." A better, non-circular definition
of animus would define it as dislike or hostility toward a class
of individuals on the basis of a false or irrational belief. For
instance, paying employees to attend HIV prevention sessions
not because of concerns about the cost of health care for
employees, but instead because the employer believes HIVinfected employees will infect customers they touch, would
constitute animus.101
The other six criteria Roberts and Leonard list, however,
are less compelling. Unfair stigmatization contains a normative
component, namely unfairness, and is therefore circularclearly it is normatively objectionable to stigmatize people in
an unfair (normatively objectionable) way, but which forms of
stigma are unfair? Clearly animus-driven stigma is unfair,
because animus is unfair, but it is unclear what the argument
is against economically driven stigma-for instance, a wellness
program that stigmatizes smoking in order to save on health
care costs or reduce secondhand smoke in the workplace.
Accordingly, unfair stigma has no independent significance.
99

Id.

100 Id. at 886 n.250.
101 What counts as an irrational belief is a complex question I cannot hope to
fully answer here. For instance, consider the example of a pharmacist who
refuses to serve a gay person because of a deeply held belief that gay people
are sinful and unclean. The pharmacist's refusal is not based on a scientific
mistake in the way that the employer's decision is, but it also is not based on
empirically verifiable or falsifiable claims. What weight to assign such
judgments in a pluralistic society is a hotly debated question in both law and
political philosophy. I am sympathetic to John Rawls's suggestion that
decisions that affect others' basic rights must be justified using "reasons we
might reasonably expect that they, as free and equal citizens, might
reasonably also accept." John Rawls, The Idea of Public Reason Revisited, 64
U. CHI. L. REV. 765, 771 (1997); see also id. at 779 (explaining that a
prohibition of same-sex marriage based purely on "religious or comprehensive
moral doctrine," without appealing to generally accessible evidence, would be
improper). Rawls's approach would disallow the pharmacist from denying
others care based purely on his sincerely and deeply held religious
convictions. Others, however, argue that sincerely and deeply held religious
convictions can be a legitimate basis for limiting others' rights, even if we
cannot reasonably believe that others could accept the bases for these
convictions.
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It is further unclear how far the concern about punishment
for private conduct applies to payments. First, given the
interconnectedness of health status, it is unclear which health
behaviors properly count as private conduct. Second, the
motivation for paying patients will not generally be punitive,
but rather will be to encourage certain forms of behavior.
Third, whether payments could be punitive even if we conceive
of punishment merely as a disadvantage depends on what
entitlement individuals have to payment-if individuals have
no entitlement to be paid, not paying them, even for private
conduct, will not count as punishment.
Meanwhile, payments to patients will not generally impede
access to health care; and, furthermore, impeding access is
sometimes acceptable. For instance, even if payments to
nonsmokers make it more difficult for smokers to access health
care, so long as smokers have reasonable access to health care,
this outcome is not obviously wrong. The same point is true for
cutting off resources.
Last, whether it is wrong to pay patients in ways that
produce worse health outcomes or exacerbate existing
disparities depends on who the actor making payments is.
While governments may have a duty not to worsen health
outcomes and to rectify disparities, it is less clear that private
individuals have such a duty, particularly as concerns the
rectification of disparities. For instance, even if paying
employees or insured individuals to improve their health
exacerbates certain economic disparities because unemployed
or uninsured people are not paid, it is not obvious that
employers or insurers have a duty to solve these disparities.
Furthermore, returning to Roberts and Leonard's initial
discussion of the connection between health status and
identity-based discrimination, payments to patients can be
designed in ways that do not have a disparate negative impact
on individuals who are disadvantaged due to their sex, race, or
other identity category. Payments to those with conditions
disproportionately suffered by the already disadvantaged (for
instance, payments for adherence to HIV) will help, rather
than hurt, disadvantaged groups. Even payments that less
often go to the disadvantaged, as might be the case with valuebased insurance payments incorporated into generous
insurance plans, do not hurt the disadvantaged but rather fail
to help them maximally. Unlike penalty programs such as
increases in insurance premiums, payments to patients are
unlikely to exacerbate the burdens that fall unfairly on
individuals due to their identities.
C. Commodification Concerns
Concerns about commodification fundamentally take the
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position that money should not be a part of certain
relationships, or should not be exchanged for certain other
things. While commodification concerns have some overlap
with deliberative worries, they are fundamentally concerns
about money itself being in a place where it ought not be or
playing a causal role it should not play, rather than about the
ways in which money affects deliberation and motivation.
A classic article by Ruth Macklin concludes that "[p]ayment
to patients to serve as research subjects is an ethically
unacceptable commodification of research practice." 102
However, defining commodification is often challenging. The
anthropologist Roberto Abadie asserts that
[o]ne of the most important critiques of the
pharmaceutical
industry
and
the
commodification of bodies in trials research is
that the process not only exploits but
dehumanizes research subjects. The tendency of
research subjects to identify themselves with
guinea pigs conveys well this notion of
disembodied self. It is also not rare for volunteers
to resort to images of torture, sex work, or
prostitution when describing their activities. 103
Abadie's objection to the "commodification of bodies" is not
transparent to understand, but one plausible gloss is that
people are seriously wronged when their bodies are used in
certain ways (even with their agreement) for economic gain.
Put more simply, it is wrong to trade health for money. 104 The
basis for this objection, however, is less clear. Torture is wrong
no matter whether the tortured party is paid for the torture.
Whether sex work is wrong seems to be up for debate, and
(following Yuracko 105 ) our concerns about individuals
participating in sex work may not reflect objections to
individuals using their bodies to earn money, but rather
concerns that their doing so limits individuals' other capacities
or the set of jobs available to others. We need more to be
persuaded that trading health for money, or otherwise
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Macklin, supra note 50, at 3.
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Similar concerns are raised in the environmental health literature-Kristin
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conditioning someone's access to money on their health status,
is wrong.
Some arguments in defense of paying people to use their
bodies in clinical research use the case of payment in
employment as an analogy, reasoning that because payment is
acceptable in employment, it is acceptable in clinical research.
Christine Grady and Neal Dickert, for instance, respond to
Marx Wartofsky's analogy between paid clinical research and
prostitution, in which he argues that "one's body is not an
appropriate 'commodity' for use in research," 106 by observing
that this objection would also apply to many other forms of
employment:
Providing incentives for any service involves, to
some extent, "commodifying" people. Paying for
research participation and the accompanying
risks does not seem inherently different from
many other paid transactions accepted as normal
parts of life. Modeling, sports, police work, and
firefighting, for example, all involve the use of
human bodies, and some entail significant
risk. 107
Emily Largent similarly argues that "[r]esearch participation is
appropriately analogised to unskilled, yet essential labour. In
the context of unskilled labour people are generally permitted
to sell their bodily services, even when that exposes them to
risks." 108
However, it could instead be argued that because paying
human subjects to put their health at risk in clinical research
is morally objectionable, paying employees to put their health
at risk is also objectionable. For this reason, Scott Halpern
correctly observes that the persuasiveness of these "consistency
arguments" is limited. He provides two additional reasons to
reject commodification arguments: (1) first, that payment for
health risks is not objectionable when neither the risks nor the
payments are individually objectionable, and (2) that the
payments would not raise concerns if they were provided to the
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Dickert & Grady, supra note 68, at 391.
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Emily Largent, For Love and Money: The Need to Rethink Benefits in HIV
Cure Studies, 43 J. MED. ETHICS 96, 99 (2017); see also Scott D. Halpern,
Financial Incentives for Research Participation: Empirical Questions,
Available Answers and the Burden of FurtherProof, 342 AM. J. MED. SCI. 290,
292 (2011) ("Claims that financial incentives for research participation are
wrong because of their degradation of the body fail simple tests of
consistency, as it seems difficult to argue that they are unacceptable while we
go on paying people for other more risky social services such as fire fighting,
coal mining or military service.").

213

THE YALE JOURNAL OF LAW & TECHNOLOGY

Vol. 20

wealthy. 109 The first argument is unconvincing: Many
activities, such as drinking and driving, are bad in combination
but not bad individually. The second is somewhat more
persuasive; however, some might object to allowing even
wealthy people to sacrifice their health in exchange for money.
Ultimately,
the
most
persuasive
response
to
commodification concerns would assert that individuals may
voluntarily choose to entangle their health with their financial
interests and that there is no obvious reason to be concerned
about such transactions in themselves when the individual's
consent appears valid. Of course, there may be persuasive
reasons to worry about the impact on third parties or on society
more generally-a concern discussed later-but it is doubtful
that we should prevent people from trading their health for
money for their own sake. Alex Rajczi discusses this argument
in the research context:
[Some] will say that allowing [risky clinical
research in which subjects participate for
financial reasons] encourages people to gamble
their health for money, and that it's wrong to try
to get people to trade their health for money, no
matter how much is being paid. I feel some
sympathy for this position, but I think it cannot
be maintained .... [T]he principal reason for my
view is that I cannot find any theoretical basis
for forbidding the offer. 110
Rajczi goes on to consider various theoretical reasons for
concern, such as coercion, deception, and exploitation, and
concludes that they do not apply. He also observes that the
research subject's decision to participate accords with her
considered judgment. For this reason, he concludes that the
offer is allowable. The same seems plausible for many cases of
health-consuming or otherwise health-involving employment.
Ultimately, as Martin Wilkinson and Andrew Moore suggest,
the most enduring basis for commodification concerns
(understood as distinct from other concerns) involves a
perfectionist ideal of social relations on which some things
simply are not traded for others; such an ideal is not internally
inconsistent, but is difficult to justify as a standard for
permitting and prohibiting conduct. "

Halpern, supra note 108, at 292.
110 Alex Rajezi, Making Risk-Benefit Assessments of Medical Research Protocols,
32 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 338, 344 (2004).
111 Martin Wilkinson & Andrew Moore, Inducements Revisited, 13 BIOETHICS
114, 127 (1999).
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D. Societal Concerns

1. Absolute and Comparative Deservingness
A major source of concern about payments for adherence,
and to a lesser extent about payments for medical outcomes, is
that they are unfair to patients who are not paid. The concern
is that if the behavior being paid for is in principle under
individuals' control, we are (1) paying people to do what they
ought to do anyway or (2) paying the undeserving more than
we pay the deserving. I categorize the first concern as one
about absolute deservingness and the second as being about
comparative deservingness.
Several discussions of programs to pay patients for
adherence or outcomes raise concerns about absolute
deservingness. For instance, Promberger et al. discussed the
potential judgment that "bad behaviour should not be
rewarded" as a reason for rejecting some incentive programs. 112
Humphreys et al. note that "paying patients to attain specific
outcomes can run into resistance by the public and sometimes
care providers as well, usually expressed in words to the effect
that 'they ought to change for free like everyone else' or 'why
should we give goodies to baddies?" 11 3 Similarly, some patients
and providers objected to a financial incentive for patients to
reduce their injectable opioid treatments on the basis that the
patients "should be doing this anyway."1 1 4 A study of New York
Times comments by Park et al. categorized 21% of comments as
raising the concern that "[f]inancial incentives reward people
for irresponsibility for which they should face the
consequences." 115 This concern has been substantiated in
practice: attendees at an addiction treatment conference stated
that "there is still some resistance in the treatment field to the
use of incentives for behaviors such as attendance at treatment
112

113

114

115

Promberger, supra note 60, at 682-687; see also Theresa M. Marteau, Richard
E. Ashcroft & Adam Oliver, Using FinancialIncentives to Achieve Healthy
Behavior, 338 BMJ b1415 (2009).
Keith Humphreys & A. Thomas McLellan, A Policy-Oriented Review of
Strategies For Improving the Outcomes of Services for Substance Use Disorder
Patients, 106 ADDICTION 2058, 2063 (2011).
Joanne Neale, Charlotte N.E. Tompkins & John Strang, Qualitative
Evaluation of a Novel Contingency Management-Related Intervention for
Patients Receiving Supervised Injectable Opioid Treatment, 111 ADDICTION
665, 669 (2015); see also Dana Mackin, Christopher Martin & Jill K.
McGavin, Response: An Insidious Dependence, 4 ADDICTION SCI. & CLINICAL
PRAC. 16, 18 (2007) ("[Wie run into the same old political arguments: 'You're
rewarding clients for things that they're supposed to do anyway."'); Nancy M.
Petry, Contingency Management Treatments: Controversies and Challenges,
105 ADDICTION 1507, 1507 (2010) (discussing the concern that it is "unethical
to pay people for what they should be doing anyway").
James D. Park et al., The New York Times Readers' Opinions About Paying
People to Take Their Medicine, 39 HEALTH EDUC. & BEHAv. 725, 728 (2012).
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and abstinence from alcohol and drugs. The resistance is in
part due to philosophical opposition to rewarding substance
abusers for something they should be doing anyway ....
A
British survey reported similar comments from public health
officers when considering a proposal to pay women to
117
breastfeed.
Concerns about comparative deservingness are also
frequently raised by providers and laypeople in discussions of
payment for adherence. For instance, a plurality of lay
respondents to one survey about the appropriateness of paying
for smoking cessation worried that "[p]aying smokers to quit is
not fair to non-smokers." 118 A study of providing incentives to
injectable drug users to attend HIV prevention workshops
noted the objection that because "other groups do not seem to
need incentives, 1 "it is unfair to provide them only to some
groups." 119 The Park et al. study found that 10% of commenters
worried that "[f]inancial incentives indirectly penalize people
120
who have good health habits."
The normative merit of these concerns, however, is dubious.
It is neither required nor prohibited to pay people for doing
what they ought to do, nor is it obviously wrong to pay some
people and not others for doing the same thing. As Deren et al.
point out, "It]he belief that some high-risk groups may be more
motivated to attend intervention sessions without incentives
does not necessarily indicate that it is therefore inappropriate
to use incentives for people or groups who may be less
motivated." 121 Another article makes a similar point:
",11

Is it fair to withhold money from other service
users, who have made the decision to stay
adherent to their depot injection without any
116 James R. McKay et al., Extending the Benefits of Addiction Treatment:
Practical Strategies for Continuing Care and Recovery, 36 J. SUBSTANCE
ABUSE TREATMENT

127, 128 (2009).

Barbara Whelan et al., Healthcare Providers' Views on the Acceptability of
Financial Incentives for Breastfeeding: A Qualitative Study, 14 BMC
PREGNANCY & CHILDBIRTH 1, 4 (2014) ("Ithink people should do things for the
sake of their health and the wellbeing of their children so I don't like the idea
of paying people to do what's good for them to do anyway.").
118 Long, Helweg-Larsen & Volpp, supra note 48, at 1651; see also Halpern,
Madison & Volpp, supra note 90, at 515 ("[Slome may consider it unfair to
pay Peter to accomplish something that Paul does for free."); Karsten Lunze
& Michael K. Paasche-Orlow, Financial Incentives for Healthy Behavior:
Ethical Safeguards for Behavioral Economics, 44 AM. J. PREVENTIVE MED.
659, 662 (2013) ("Incentive programs aiming at behavior change might be
unfair to those who already behave in a healthy way, in cases where
programs reward only those with unhealthy behaviors ....).
119 Sherry Deren et al., The Impact of Providing Incentives for Attendance at
AIDS Prevention Sessions, 109 PUB. HEALTH REP. 548, 553 (1994).
120 Park et al., supra note 115, at 728.
121 Deren et al., supra note 119, at 553.
117
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incentive (and who, as a consequence, then might
ask for that money as well)? If we think of
[payments to patients] as remuneration for the
effort, pain and possible side effects that the
service user has from long-term depot injections,
then this is probably unfair to more compliant
users. However, if we think about this as an
incentive for adherence, merely tilting the
balance of an individual's informed decisionmaking process (much in the way as it happens
with more informal gratification) towards drug
adherence, person-centred incentives would not
necessarily be unfair, as they (like the benefit
system) merely take into account that some
people need more positive reinforcement to
succeed than others .... 122
While paying people who are thought more likely to be nonadherent for adherence means that economic rewards do not
necessarily track virtuous moral character, the notion that
virtuous character entitles people to economic rewards is a
dubious one, endorsed neither by theorists of distributive
justice nor by economists. 123 As Claassen states, the main
purpose of payment incentives is to help the health care system
achieve its preferred outcomes-while payment incentives
could be designed to reward virtue and punish vice, they need
not do so. It is similarly mistaken to claim that it is in general
"unfair to pay people different amounts of money for
performing the same activities." 124 What people should be paid
depends on what they will do if not paid and whether paying
them a given amount will effectively achieve the payer's goal.
While a payer is certainly permitted to endorse the principle
that people should be paid the same amount if they do the
same thing, the choice to pay patients does not involve a
commitment to any specific vision about the goals of health
care or health policy. Rather, payments to patients could be
used in service of a variety of reasonable health policy goals.
Another objection contends that paying people to be
adherent will incentivize people who would have been adherent
in the absence of payment to change their behavior in order to
receive incentives. 125 This is largely an empirical question and
122

123

124

125

Dirk Claassen, Financial Incentives for Antipsychotic Depot Medication:
Ethical Issues, 33 J. MED. ETHICS 189, 192 (2007).
See Elizabeth Anderson, Thomas Paine's "AgrarianJustice" and the Origins
of Social Insurance, in TEN NEGLECTED CLASSICS OF PHILOSOPHY 55, 75-76
(Eric Schliesser ed., 2016).
David B. Resnik, Bioethical Issues in Providing Financial Incentives to
Research Participants,5 MEDICOLEGAL &BIOETHICS 35, 39 (2015).
E.g., Joanne Shaw, Is It Acceptable for People to Be Paid to Adhere to
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involves considering two important factors. First, to answer the
question, one must analyze how likely people actually are to
change their behavior in order to become eligible for incentives.
Even though providing incentives to drug addicts could in
principle encourage non-addicts to become addicted in order to
obtain incentives, the other disadvantages of becoming
addicted are likely to prevent this form of incentive-seeking. So
long as eligibility is based on a well-designed criterion rather
than a pure self-report, incentive-seeking is unlikely to be a
problem. 126 Second, the answer to the empirical question
depends on the cost of alternative methods of encouraging
adherence or otherwise encouraging good outcomes. Even if
there is some economic inefficiency in paying patients to be
adherent (because some patients will seek to become eligible
for incentives, and some patients who receive incentives would
have done what they are being paid to do even in the absence of
payment), paying for adherence will often still be the most
effective way, all things considered, to improve outcomes. 127
2. Effects on Others' Options
The option of being paid to make medical decisions, even if
desired by some patients, may be worse for others. Building on
an example of Yuracko's, if some chemistry professors are
allowed to work as sexy chemistry professors, they may draw
students away from ordinary chemistry classes, thus
diminishing the demand for chemistry teaching positions that
are not sex-plus positions. 128 Similarly, patients who are willing
to accept financial incentives do not merely receive
compensation, but also affect the health care system in ways
that may reduce the opportunities for workers unwilling to
receive incentives. For instance, if financial incentives become
predominant as a mode of reducing dependence on opioids,
Medication? No, 335 BRIT. MED. J. 233, 233 (2007) ("Paying for adherence,
whether in the form of cash or non-financial benefits, creates all the wrong
incentives because we cannot screen out people who would adhere anyway.
By introducing payment, voluntary adherence will disappear. Why should
patients agree to take medicines for nothing if they can be paid?"); George
Szmukler, FinancialIncentives for Patients in the Treatment of Psychosis, 35
J. MED. ETHICS 224, 227 (2009) ("The question of fairness is even more
strongly at issue under a scheme where only those unlikely to comply with
medication would be offered [incentives]. Why should patients who decide to
take medication be penalised for a prudent choice? Perhaps many patients,
content to take medication, would be tempted to say they would not, in order
to receive the inducement.").
126 Kevin G. Volpp et al., P4P4P: An Agenda for Research On Pay-ForPerformance For Patients, 28 HEALTH AFF. 206, 209 (2009) ("Another issue is
the need for precise targeting so that incentive programs do not largely
reward people for doing 'what they would have done anyway."').
127 Robertson, supra note 45, at 921-22.
128
Cf. Yuracko, supra note 76, at 202-03.
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patients who prefer other methods of reducing dependence,
such as psychological counseling, may find their options
reduced.
Furthermore, the existence of the option of being paid can
lead to pressure to take that option. Rather than offering
unconditional aid, private individuals or public programs may
ask patients to seek out payment incentives first. Debra Satz
discusses this concern in regard to payment for organs, noting
that if payment for organs is permitted, organs could become a
requirement as collateral for loans, or individuals could be
required to sell their organs prior to becoming eligible for
129
public assistance.
3. Creating Corrosive Disadvantages
Payments to patients may further be objectionable because
they make inequality more significant. Consider the cases of
inclusive shared savings or Robertson's "split benefit"
proposal. 130 If there is no economic reward for choosing a more
cost-effective treatment, then both wealthy and poor patients
may be equally likely to select a given treatment. In contrast, if
there is an economic reward, then wealthy patients may be
more likely to pay extra for a less cost-effective but marginally
more effective (or no more effective) brand-name medication,
while poorer patients may uniformly opt for the more costeffective generic. Certain medical services may become
markers of economic status, just as consumer goods are now.
To borrow from Jonathan Wolff and Avner de-Shalit's
framework, payments to patients can turn economic status into
a "corrosive disadvantage," where having less money not only
means that a patient ends up with consumer goods that are
less desirable, but also that the patient ends up with less
desirable health care. 131
This objection is complicated to assess. Unconditional
economic transfers, or universal social programs that deliver
most of their benefits to the least advantaged, can achieve
societal gains without singling out people by economic status.
However, these unconditional programs could potentially
involve much higher costs. Furthermore, if private purchase of
a good is permitted, wealthier patients may opt out of even
unconditional programs (in the way that private hospitals
might co-exist with a public system). Unless we combine a
universal guarantee with a prohibition on going outside that
guarantee, it is difficult to prevent economic status from
129

Debra Satz, The Moral Limits of Markets: The Case of Human Kidneys, 108
PROC. ARISTOTELIAN SOCY

269, 286 (2008).

130

See Robertson, supra note 45, at 944-46
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affecting individuals' access to health care or their consumption
of health care resources. Furthermore, it is doubtful that
payments to patients genuinely convert economic status into a
corrosive disadvantage. Returning to Wolff and de-Shalit's
framework, these payments may instead allow economically
disadvantaged
individuals
to
narrow
their
overall
disadvantage-rather than having equally good health care but
a very poor economic position, a patient may prefer to accept
different (and slightly worse) care in exchange for a better
overall economic position.
4.

Inefficiency

There are a variety of reasons we might worry that paying
patients to achieve certain outcomes is inefficient. One is that,
under some circumstances,
simply improving patients'
economic circumstances may be more effective at achieving
good health outcomes than paying patients to achieve those
outcomes. 132 Another is the worry that paying patients may
undermine their long-term motivation to do the activities they
were being paid to do previously. 133 This concern is termed
"crowding out" in the social-scientific literature. However,
there is some evidence that crowding out is less likely where
health-related behaviors are concerned. 134 A third is that
payments may simply be too expensive relative to the benefits
produced.
These are all ultimately empirical questions, which can be
assessed through social-scientific research. Rather than
speculating about the likely outcome of that research, I only
note here that these efficiency accounts presuppose some
background theory of fair distribution on which-even if other
factors also matter-total societal welfare plays a major role.
The relative importance of total welfare compared to other
values will determine the place that efficiency considerations
should have in our evaluations.
III. PAYING PATIENTS: NORMATIVE CATEGORIES AND
FRAMEWORKS

Cluver & Lorraine Sherr, Cash Transfers Magic Bullet or
FundamentalIngredient?, 4 LANCET GLOBAL HEALTH e883, e884 (2016) ("The
infrastructure and cost of policing the conditions reduces reach to individuals
at highest risk. The clear lessons from this study are that conditionality does
not substantially advance the cause ....).
E.g., Bruno S. Frey & Reto Jegen, Motivation Crowding Theory, 15 J. ECON.
SURVEYS 589, 596-97 (2001).
Marianne Promberger & Theresa M. Marteau, When Do FinancialIncentives
Reduce Intrinsic Motivation? ComparingBehaviors Studied in Psychological
and Economic Literatures, 32 HEALTH PSYCHOL. 950, 955-56 (2013).

132 Lucie

133
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Assessing the concerns that have been raised about
payment to patients suggests that such payments merit neither
blanket disapproval nor blanket disapprobation. Rather,
determining when these payments are appropriate requires a
nuanced weighing of their advantages against their
disadvantages. I turn now to the question of when-in light of
the concerns identified above-payments to patients should be
regarded as normatively appropriate or inappropriate.
Currently, payments are frequently categorized by their factual
context-for instance, they are grouped into payments for
smoking cessation, research participation, or medication
adherence. A better system would look to the rights and duties
of the actors making payments to patients and how the
payments affect these actors and their relationships with
patients. In this Part, I consider three salient categories of such
actors: "micro-level" actors like providers; "meso-level" actors
like insurers and hospitals; and "macro-level" actors such as
135
governments.
A. Providers
Payments to patients-both by providers and by otherscan affect providers in a variety of ways. Providers who pay
patients to use their services spend some money up front to
increase use of services, potentially leading to greater revenues
down the line. Meanwhile, providers who pay for adherence can
improve the efficacy of providers' treatment efforts, allowing
providers to treat patients more quickly and efficiently.
Payments by actors other than providers can also affect
providers: insurers and governments who pay patients to
decline services can hurt providers' bottom line, while
payments to use certain services (such as screening or family
planning services) can increase utilization of some providers'
services.
In this Section, I focus on how payment might affect the
provider-patient relationship and providers' obligations to
patients. I focus on the physician-patient relationship, though I
recognize that there are a variety of other providers, such as
nurses, physician assistants, and medical paraprofessionals.
Ezekiel and Linda Emanuel suggest four models for the
physician-patient relationship: paternalistic, informative,
interpretive, and deliberative. 136 Each model will be affected in
different ways by payments to patients.
First,"[i]n the paternalistic model, the physician acts as the
135
136

For this terminology, I draw partially on Note, Scarce Medical Resources, 69
COLUM. L. REV. 620 (1969).
Ezekiel J. Emanuel & Linda L. Emanuel, Four Models of the PhysicianPatientRelationship, 267 JAMA 2221, 2221-22 (1992).
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patient's guardian, articulating and implementing what is best
for the patient." 137 On this model, physicians and other similar
providers would be free to provide incentives whenever they
think doing so would be good for the patient, regardless of the
patient's autonomous preference. However, incentives may be
unnecessary, given the power of the physician simply to
implement the care program that she judges best: "At the
extreme, the physician authoritatively informs the patient
when the intervention will be initiated." 138 Because this model
puts less of an emphasis on patients' autonomous decisions,
concerns that payments constitute coercion or undue
inducement, or that they divert patients from proper
deliberation, do not apply. However, there could still be
concerns about payments to patients that make the patients
worse off by communicating disrespect or undermining
patients' intrinsic motivations.
Second, in the informative model, "the objective of the
physician-patient interaction is for the physician to provide the
patient with all relevant information, for the patient to select
the medical interventions that he or she wants, and for the
physician to execute the selected interventions." 139 This model
leaves little room for the use of incentives, since the patient is
presumed to arrive with well-formed preferences to which the
provider should defer-the only room for provider intervention
will be sharing information about available interventions and
their consequences. In particular, this model will reject
payment incentives that interfere with patients' autonomous
decisions regarding treatment.
Third, the interpretive model sees the physician as a
"counselor, analogous to a cabinet minister's advisory role to a
head of state, supplying relevant information, helping to
elucidate values, and suggesting what medical interventions
realize these values." 140 This model allows more room for
payment incentives, insofar as they may help a patient
overcome weakness of will in order to better realize his or her
core values.
Last, Emanuel and Emanuel endorse the deliberative
model. In this model, "the physician acts as a teacher or friend,
engaging the patient in dialogue on what course of action
would be best." 14 1 Furthermore, "[n]ot only does the physician
indicate what the patient could do, but, knowing the patient
and wishing what is best, the physician indicates what the
patient should do, what decision regarding medical therapy
Id. at 2221.
Id.
139 Id.
140 Id. at 2223.
141 Id.
137
138
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would be admirable." 142 The deliberative model assumes that
physicians have or can gain access to privileged knowledge
about which medical decisions are morally admirable. In this
way, the deliberative model is like the paternalistic model.
However, the deliberative model makes more of an effort to
alter the patient's deliberation than the paternalistic model
does. While the paternalist simply ignores the patient's
requests when they diverge from what is medically best
according to an objective criterion, the deliberative physician
attempts to get the patient to request what is medically best. It
is not clear what the deliberative model counsels in cases
where patients are not persuaded: Emanuel and Emanuel
claim that "the physician aims at no more than moral
persuasion: ultimately, coercion is avoided, and the patient
must define his or her life and select the ordering of values to
143
be espoused."
Of these models, the deliberative model should be the
friendliest to payment incentives. However, payment incentives
are consistent with the deliberative model only when they
promote deliberation between patient and physician. If
incentives serve to make patients suspicious of physicians'
commitment to help, or if incentives are so large that they
foreclose the relevance of the patient's health, they will be
inconsistent with the deliberative model. The deliberative
model is likely to be friendly to inclusive shared-savings
payments, given the model's emphasis on the importance of
144
encouraging the patient to do what is in the public interest,
and will also be favorable to payments for adherence that serve
to encourage patients to deliberate.
B. Insurers and Hospitals
Unlike direct health care providers such as physicians and
nurses, "meso-level" actors like hospitals and insurers are not
governed by a specific code of professional ethics, nor do they
stand in a close relationship to patients. Accordingly, a more
applicable model for these actors comes from business ethics.
Joseph Heath has suggested a "market failures approach" to
business ethics, on which businesses have a duty not to exploit
failures in markets. 145 Heath suggests that businesses have a
moral permission to seek profits because (in a perfectly
competitive market) their profit-seeking will produce good
outcomes, but concludes that this permission is granted by
142
143
144

145

Id.
Id.
See id. (explaining that the deliberative model involves suggesting altruistic
motivations to patients).
See JOSEPH HEATH, MORALITY, COMPETITION, AND THE FIRM: THE MARKET
FAILURES APPROACH TO BUSINESS ETHICS (2014).
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society on the condition that businesses not exploit various
market imperfections. Heath grants that some of these
conditions may be too demanding in a context where other
firms are not following them-for instance, if other firms are
trying to create barriers to entry, it may be self-defeating not to
do so as well. However, he suggests that these conditions still
represent important guiding principles for business ethics.
Applying an account of business ethics to markets in health
care and health insurance represents an important and
complex project, in light of the numerous ways in which these
markets diverge from competitive ideals. Business ethics
principles could help to provide a better justification for an
improved anti-kickback law and generally a better set of norms
for when payment incentives from providers would be
permitted. However, the task of developing these norms goes
beyond this Article's scope.
C. Governments
Whether "macro-level" actors like governments should
provide incentives will be contingent on the proper role of
government, which is itself a topic of substantial debate.
However, there are certain governmental goals that garner
agreement across a wide variety of perspectives, such as the
provision of public goods. 146 Paying patients to achieve public
goods, such as the prevention of infectious disease, is the sort of
initiative that should garner broad support. In contrast,
payments to patients that unduly induce them to take health
risks, or that take advantage of patients' limited rationality in
order to financially exploit them, should not be supported.
Government endorsement of certain incentives also raises
distinctive questions about what government action expresses
to patients and to others. 147 Governmental decisions to pay
patients may express disrespect for those patients, or for
individuals who are not paid, in different ways than do private
decisions. This suggests that governments should be
particularly careful to ensure that their payments to patients
do not, for instance, exacerbate disadvantages along identity146

See, e.g., Cabot Corp. v. United States, 694 F. Supp. 949, 957 (Ct. Int'l Trade
1988) ("Governments provide many such [public] goods and services because
of the inability of the price system to effectively provide these goods, which
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tend to be indivisible and collectively consumable by all citizens whether they
pay for them or not."); see also Liberty Univ., Inc. v. Geithner, 671 F.3d 391,
447 (4th Cir. 2011) (Davis, J., dissenting) ("[G]overnments are formed
precisely to compel purchases of public goods.").
Cf.Elizabeth S. Anderson & Richard H. Pildes, Expressive Theories of Law: A
General Restatement, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1503, 1520 (2000) ("Expressive
theories of law are concerned with evaluating state action. On the rights and
equality side of constitutional law, such theories assert that state action is
required to express the appropriate attitudes toward persons.").
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based category lines.
D. Private Individuals
Private individuals enjoy the broadest permission to offer
incentives to patients. Because patients stand in no particular
relationship to private individuals, and private individuals
have little power over individual patients, patients' options will
typically not be seriously constrained by payment incentives
offered by private individuals, and those incentives will also be
easy to avoid. Accordingly, even if-for instance-it would be
impermissible for governments, insurers, or doctors to pay
patients to seek sterilization or not to have abortions, it will
generally be permissible for private individuals to make these
sorts of offers.
However, even if private individuals typically act
permissibly in offering incentives, they may not always act
admirably. As discussed above, certain offers may
communicate insult or disrespect to others. When rapper Ralo
"made it rain" on homeless people in an effort to help them, he
was criticized for insulting his beneficiaries. One commentator
summarized the effort:
"There may be better ways to have a profound
impact, but it doesn't mean an impact wasn't
made," said John Moeller, the executive director
of Action Ministries, which houses and feeds
homeless families in Atlanta. "I'm of the belief
that if there's one person trying to do some good
in the world, we should encourage that. I
celebrate the generosity that was offered up.
Maybe the process he used could have been
better." 148
If we imagine a public health version of Ralo-one who decided
to shower dollar bills on program participants leaving a HIV
education meeting or a class on prenatal nutrition-we can see
a similar ambivalence. Even though offering these incentives in
these ways is permissible, it does not exemplify the best way of
treating others. Offering a better alternative, however, is a
highly contextual task.

148

Cleve R. Wootson, Jr., Why This Atlanta Rapper Tried to Make it Rain' on the
Homeless,
WASH.
POST
(Oct.
25,
2016),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/arts-andentertainment/wp/2016/10/25/why-this-atlanta-rapper-tried-to-make-it -rainon-the-homeless/ [http://perma.cc/55NP-Y2JR].
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IV. PAYING PATIENTS: LEGAL ISSUES
Paying patients further presents a variety of legal
implementation issues. In this Part, I discuss a few such
issues.
A. Taxability and Program Eligibility
Many concerns about payment to patients involve worries
that patients are underpaid relative to the benefits they
provide society. As such, it is important to consider not just the
gross value of payments, but their net value once taxes and
other consequences of earned income are taken into account.
Such a considered approach involves assessing whether
payments to patients will count as income for tax purposes and
whether they will affect eligibility for means-tested social
programs. 149 The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has been clear
that incentive payments in wellness programs, as well as
payments to participants in clinical research, constitute
taxable income. 150 (It is unclear, though, whether these
payments should also be subject to self-employment taxes; the
IRS has taken the position that whether they are hinges on
whether "the participants are in a trade or business of
participating in medical research studies." 151 ) However,
employers and insurers do have the option of using discounts
on insurance premiums, which would make an incentive nontaxable, rather than incentive payments. 152 Clinical research
facilities could potentially replace payments with discounts on
their treatment charges, though this has not been described in
149
150

151

152

See Claassen et al., supra note 23, at 6 ("Will the money received for
medication have an impact on social and disability allowances?").
On wellness programs, see Memorandum from Stephen Tackney, Deputy
Assistant Chief Counsel (Emp. Benefits), to Mark Ericson, Senior Att'y, Tax
Treatment of Wellness Program Benefits and Employer Reimbursement of
Premiums Provided Pre-tax Under a Section 125 Cafeteria Plan (Apr. 14,
2016), http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-wd/201622031.pdf [http://perma.cc/H38HK7VX]; on clinical trials, see Indiana State University Guidelines for
Compensation to Human Research Participants, IND.
ST. U.,
http://www2.indstate.edu/controller/docs/ISU%/20Guidelines%/20for%/20Comp
ensation%20for%20Research%20Participation.pdf
[http://perma.cc/2SW5WQHE], citing IRS Private Letter Ruling 9106004 (Aug. 2, 1990).
Memorandum from Janine Cook, Branch Chief, to Glenn DeLoreia, Acting
Program Manager, Reporting SECA Payments Made to Medical Research
Participants
(Sept.
17,
2007),
http://www.irs.gov/pub/lanoa/pmtaOl353 7356.pdf
[http://perma.cc/Y56F2LAL].
See Kevin G. Volpp et al., Redesigning Employee Health Incentives Lessons
from Behavioral Economics, 365 NEW ENGL. J. MED. 388, 390 (2011)
("Providing rewards outside the premium framework would make them
taxable, and it's unclear whether a taxed but more salient reward is more
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the literature. There is no literature on the taxability of various
payments for adherence, such as the contingency management
payments made to discourage addiction.
Another approach that has been used in designing
government-provided incentives is to expressly exclude
incentive payments from the income considered when
determining eligibility for means-tested programs. Several
provisions of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) as initially drafted
did this, 153 as did a provision of the Social Security Act that
"provides for the income and resource exclusion of
compensation received for participating in clinical trials
researching and testing treatment of rare diseases or
154
conditions."
B. Antidiscrimination Law
Another concern discussed above involves the charge that
payments discriminate. Payments that favor the healthy over
the unhealthy, or the disabled over the non-disabled, could not
only be unethical but also be violations of law. Several federal
statutes potentially apply to payments to patients, including
the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), the Health
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA), the
Genetic Information Non-Discrimination Act (GINA), and the
Affordable Care Act (ACA). 155 The ADA and GINA regulate the
request of medical information, whereas the ACA and HIPAA
directly regulate insurers. Broadly speaking, the ACA and
HIPAA are more permissive, whereas the ADA and GINA are
more restrictive.
The ACA differentiates incentive payments into two
categories, "participatory" (requiring only the performance of
some behavior) and "health-contingent" (requiring the
achievement of an outcome). Participatory incentives are less
tightly regulated than health-contingent ones: The ACA
permits
premium discounts, rebates, or other rewards not
based on satisfying a health status factor-related
153

154

See 124 Stat. 564 (2010) ("Any incentives provided to a Medicaid beneficiary
participating in a program described in subsection (a)(3) shall not be taken
into account for purposes of determining the beneficiary's eligibility for, or
amount of, benefits under the Medicaid program or any program funded in
whole or in part with Federal funds.").
Social Security Program Operations Manual System, SI 00830. 735 Payments
for
Clinical
Trial
Participation,
SOC.
SECURITY
ADMIN.,
http://secure.ssa.gov/poms.nsf/lnx/0500830735
[http://perma.cc/X5W8-

UHNM
155

Michelle R. Seares, Note, Wellness at Work: Reconciling the Affordable Care
Act with the Americans with DisabilitiesAct, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 218, 22425 (2016).
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standard as long as they are available to all
similarly situated individuals. Thus, plans are
permitted
to
reimburse
costs
for
gym
memberships or offer rewards for attending
smoking cessation programs. In addition, the
ACA permits rewards based on satisfaction of a
health status factor-related standard if the
program meets a series of requirements.
Rewards may take many forms, including "a
discount or rebate of a premium or contribution,
a waiver of all or part of a cost sharing
mechanism[,] . . .the absence of a surcharge, or

the value of a benefit that would otherwise not be
provided under the plan." A program involving a
reward for maintaining a specified BMI or a
penalty for those who use tobacco would be
156
subject to these requirements.
Notwithstanding these permissions, the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission has filed three lawsuits challenging
large participatory incentives-even if compliant with the
ACA-as violating the ADA. These incentive programs were
framed as penalties rather than rewards, with employees who
declined to participate in wellness programs being subject to
charges. However, whether a program framed as a reward
would violate the ADA is a complex question. A recent student
note characterizes large incentives as coercive regardless of
whether they represent a bonus or penalty, but-as I discuss in
Part III-coercion is an inapt description of a program that
offers benefits to which individuals are not entitled. 157 A betterframed concern is that incentives for participatory programs
violate the ADA insofar as they objectionably condition access
to financial advantage on willingness to answer disabilityrelated questions, or similarly violate GINA with respect to
genetics-related questions. However, many incentive programs
do not target either genetic conditions or disabilities, but
instead focus on other health problems. There is no obvious
antidiscrimination bar to such programs.
State law represents another basis on which payments to
patients might be categorized as discriminatory. Madison,
Volpp, and Halpern note that "[a] number of states have
enacted statutes that prohibit employers from discriminating
against employees based on smoking outside the workplace,
perhaps reflecting in part concerns about employers'

156
157

Madison, Volpp & Halpern, supra note 49, at 462.
Seares, supra note 155, at 244; on coercion, see Madison, Volpp & Halpern,
supra note 49, at 459-60.
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interference in employees' personal lives." 158 Relevant issues
for these statutes' potential application to financial incentives
include whether these statutes apply to incentives as well as
penalties and whether they apply to actors other than
employers.
Matt Lamkin advances the related argument that programs
that incentivize employees to make certain health care
decisions, such as taking particular medications, violate
informed consent because employees are faced with a choice
between paying more for insurance or making health care
decisions they would prefer not to make. 159 But the fact that
one stands to gain or lose much from a given decision cannot be
enough to vitiate informed consent. For instance, if a taxi
driver would lose his driver's license if he refused to get
glasses, this would be a major incentive to make the health
care decision to see an optometrist and spend money on
glasses, but it would not vitiate informed consent.
C. Anti-Kickback Statutes
As Part I discussed, some payments to patients to purchase
or use certain health care interventions may constitute illegal
kickbacks. One recent article describes the purpose of the
federal anti-kickback statute:
The statute incorporates the premise that
because, generally, the more patients a medical
provider sees, the more revenue the provider
generates from federal health-care programs,
like Medicare, then anything "given" to patients
that makes them more likely to see the medical
provider may be a prohibited kickback that could
lead to criminal prosecution or civil monetary
penalties. This kickback would potentially have
the result of generating more fees for the medical
provider, while concomitantly driving up the cost
of federal health-care programs.1 6 0
Paying patients whose medical care is publicly funded to
use that care may benefit patients, but also incentivizes the
consumption of a public resource: because patients do not
experience all-and in some cases do not experience any-of
the cost of care, paying even small kickbacks could be an easy
way to increase consumption. At least one justification for the
Madison, Volpp & Halpern, supra note 49, at 454.
Lamkin, supra note 73, at 448-51.
160 Robert J. Baror, Transportationand the Anti-Kickback Statute: A Tortured
Route with A New Safe Harbor,FED. LAW., Mar. 2015, at 18.
158
159
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statute is that conserving public resources is an important
enough goal to justify prohibiting payment incentives.
However, it is normatively unclear that kickbacks to
patients are objectionable, even in the cases of patients whose
care is publicly funded. Kickbacks paid to actors other than the
patient are objectionable for reasons other than resource
conservation, since such kickbacks encourage these actors to
put their financial interests
above patients'
medical
interests. 161 In contrast, paying kickbacks to patients
themselves does not raise a concern about dual loyalties, but
only about resource conservation. If a kickback draws in
patients who otherwise would not receive care and pays them
money at the same time, the public treasury is being used to
fund patient care (even if providers also profit from the
increased use of their services at public expense). Meanwhile, if
the kickback simply draws patients from other providers, then
inter-provider competition to pay the most attractive kickback
will merely serve to transfer money from providers to patients,
with no net burden on the public treasury. Such kickbacks do
not seem obviously more objectionable than, for instance, a
college offering to match federally funded financial aid with its
own private aid. While it may be objectionable for kickbacks,
such as drug coupons for brand-name drugs, to lead patients to
use expensive, non-beneficial care, a more effective way of
limiting such care is to limit provider reimbursements for
offering it, for instance by imposing formulary restrictions.
Concerns about kickbacks offered to patients should be
even more attenuated when the patients are privately insured.
Providers should not bill insurers for services patients never
paid for,16 2 but it is not obvious that providers act wrongly by
encouraging patients to spend private insurers' money freely.
To the extent insurers want patients to curb their spending,
they could compete with providers by offering shared-savings
Timothy Stoltzfus Jost & Sharon Davies, The Fraud and Abuse Statute:
Rationalizing or Rationalization?,15 HEALTH AFF. 129, 129 (1996) (describing
one "purpose for the bribe and kickback and self-referral laws" as being "to
regulate conflicts of interest in the practice of medicine"); Aaron Chess
Lichtman, Note, Commercial Exploitation of DNA and the Tort of Conversion:
A PhysicianMay Not Destroy A Patient's Interest in Her Body-Matter, 34 N.Y.
L. SCH. L. REV. 531, 559 (1989) (arguing that anti-kickback rules "prevent
physicians from using their positions of trust to induce their patient into
giving them gifts, and from creating financial interests which may interfere
with their complete loyalty to their patient").
162 See Aetna, Inc. v. Health Diagnostic Lab. Inc., No. CV 15-1868, 2016 WL
6070542, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 17, 2016) ("The routine waivers of patient
copayments and coinsurance effectively afforded a discount to Aetna
members from the amounts that the Aetna members would normally be
161

billed ....

The billed charges submitted to Aetna should have been reduced

by the amount of the considerable co-payments and coinsurance amounts
that had been waived, but the billed charges never accounted for those
discounts.").
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payments along the lines Schmidt and Emanuel suggest 16 3 patients could decide whether they prefer to accept the
provider's preferred treatment and receive a kickback, or
accept the insurer's preferred treatment and receive a shared
savings payment. Such competition would be better for
patients, though perhaps worse for insurers and providers.
Federal courts have been reluctant to classify financial
16 4
incentives to privately insured patients as illegal kickbacks,
though some states have taken express measures to prohibit
kickbacks to privately insured patients. 165
D. Contract Issues
Payments to patients will in some cases involve contracts
between patients and payers. These contracts could potentially
be void on the basis of being against public policy, on the basis
that the patients lacked the capacity to contract, or on some
other basis. They could also be unenforceable. The public-policy
concern connects with a variety of the normative concerns
above, whereas the lack-of-capacity concern is more specific.
If patients are paid to harm their own health or otherwise
diminish individual capacity, or if paying patients will clearly
hurt the public health, the contract might be void for being
against public policy-as allowed for under the laws of many
states.16 6 Courts have held insurance policies that incentivized
insureds not to report sexual misconduct (by reducing
insurance payouts in cases that involved sexual misconduct) to
be void as against public policy, because the prevention of
sexual misconduct is an important public interest.16 7 A court
also held a settlement agreement that prohibited the disclosure
163
164

165

166

167

See Schmidt & Emanuel, supra note 40.
Am. Fed'n of State, Cty. & Mun. Employees Dist. Council 37 Health & Sec.
Plan v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 948 F. Supp. 2d 338, 352 (S.D.N.Y. 2013)
(rejecting the view that the "use of co-pay subsidy cards-or the routine
waiver of co-pay obligations in the context of private insurers-states a claim
for health care fraud").
Andrew Grosso, Medical Necessity and the Medicare and Medicaid AntiKickback Statute, 40 FED. B. NEWS & J. 301, 306 (1993) ("Private insurance is
not covered by any federal kickback statute. The responsibility to protect
private insurance carriers falls to the states. Sometimes this protection takes
the form of a criminal remedy, and sometimes it is limited to a professional
sanction, such as suspension from the practice of medicine."); Jason M. Healy,
William M. Altman & Thomas C. Fox, Confidentiality of Health Care Provider
Quality of Care Information, 40 BRANDEIS L.J. 595, 606 n.36 (2002) ("Some
state anti-kickback statutes are broad enough to cover kickbacks without
regard to the type of payor (e.g., Medicare, Medicaid, private insurance, or
individual).").
E.g., Lesieur v. Inhabitants of Rumford, 93 A. 838, 839 (Me. 1915); LaPoint v.
Richards, 403 P.2d 889, 895 (Wash. 1965).
Am. Home Ins. Co. v. Cohen, 815 F. Supp. 365 (W.D. Wash. 1993), affd 67
F.3d 305 (9th Cir. 1995).
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of physician misconduct to be void because it violated the
public policy expressed in "a statute designed to protect public
health by ensuring that medical staffs have full information in
their hiring decisions." 61 8 Analogously, courts might potentially
void a payment incentive contract if it encouraged conduct that
was against the public interest-for instance, if it encouraged
unhealthy behavior or the consumption of public resources.
Contracts might also be void if the patients agreeing to
them lacked the mental capacity to contract. A Virginia case
observes that habitually drunk individuals may lack that
capacity:
[W]hen a person's habitual addiction to
intoxication renders him extremely subject to
imposition, such habits, though not carried to an
excess constituting absolute incapacity, lay a
ground for strict examination whether any
instrument executed by him does not in itself, or
in the attendant circumstances, contain evidence
that advantage was taken of those habits.16 9
Similar concerns arise, for instance, if an incentive program for
cocaine addicts involved a contract.
For many payments to patients, these contract issues can
be avoided by using a unilateral contract that can only be
accepted through performance, in which the incentive provider
offers to pay if and only if the patient brings proof of having
engaged in the desired behavior or having achieved the desired
outcome. Unilateral contracts are frequently used where prizes
or rewards are offered, 170 and payments to clinical trial
participants have been analyzed under a unilateral contract
framework. 171 A person who receives what they were promised
in a unilateral contract can have no complaint. For instance,
even if "bodily contract" clauses, where individuals forfeit
benefits if their weight exceeds a certain amount, might be
voidable, 172 someone who is paid a certain amount for losing
Walton v. Jennings Cmty. Hosp., 875 F.2d 1317, 1323 (7th Cir. 1989).
Taliaferro v. Emery, 98 S.E. 627 (Va. 1919).
170 Melvin Eisenberg, Probabilityand Chance in Contract Law, 45 UCLA L. REV.
1005, 1041 (1998) ("[Pirizes and rewards have an important structural
similarity: they are offers to pay for the performance of an act, normally by a
member of the public, and therefore constitute prototypical unilateral
contracts.").
171 Seema Shah & Patricia Zettler, From a ConstitutionalRight to a Policy of
Exceptions: Abigail Alliance and the Future of Access to Experimental
Therapy, 10 YALE J. HEALTH POL'Y, L. & ETHICS 135, 154-55 (discussing Dahl
v. HEM Pharm. Corp., 7 F.3d 1399 (9th Cir. 1993)).
172 See Veronica Colon-Padilla, Note, The 'Miss America" Ideal: An Analysis of
the Legality and Enforceability of Bodily Contract Clauses Within Modern
Pageantry and the Gender and Cultural Implications of Using
168
169
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weight has no basis for challenging the incentive system. Glenn
Cohen discusses an interesting unilateral contract case
involving, in effect, an incentive concerning reproductive
choices:
[A] Missouri case involving a father who
disinherited his unwed pregnant daughter, but
agreed to put her back in the will if she would
terminate her pregnancy, which she did, actually
found the contract enforceable notwithstanding
that getting an abortion was the consideration.
But the setting is unusual, and involved a
unilateral contract that could only be accepted by
performance, so in a real sense it could not be
enforced against the daughter. 173
As Cohen observes, the daughter was able to require the father
to put her back in the will, but the daughter could not have
taken the proffered incentive and then complained that the
contract was unenforceable as against public policy, because
she would have already done the act being incentivized. The
only danger of the unilateral-contract model is that the
possibility that the payer will attempt to back out of the offeron the basis that the offer he himself made is against public
policy-may make the incentive less attractive.
CONCLUSION

Payments to patients raise numerous interesting issues,
both legal and ethical. One contribution I hope to have made,
regardless of whether readers agree with my normative
conclusion, is to have provided a taxonomy and review of the
terrain. In particular, it is important to distinguish conceptual
questions about payments (such as whether they violate
individuals' rights or prevent an ideal form of deliberation)
from empirical questions (such as whether they weaken
individuals' intrinsic motivation or whether the costs of
administering them outweigh the benefits). It is also important
to distinguish different types of normative concerns from one
another and distinguish different actors who might provide
incentives.
Despite the presence of normative concerns about payments
to patients, I believe such systems deserve to be tried in
Governmentally Unregulated Weight Requirements, 34 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP.
79, 101 (2012).
173 I. Glenn Cohen, The Constitution and the Rights Not To Procreate, 60 STAN.
L. REV. 1135, 1192 n.234 (2008) (citation omitted) (discussing L.G. v. F.G.H,
729 S.W.2d 634 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987)).
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practice. They have the potential to be cost-effective and
efficacious (which studies have borne out), and they could be
implemented quickly and flexibly. In environments where
larger social programs are difficult to enact and where
government actors are unresponsive, payments are easy for
private and non-governmental actors to pilot. Concerns that
payments, as opposed to penalties, coerce individuals are illfounded.
In thinking about where to start with payments to patients,
the potential to benefit disadvantaged individuals must be
balanced against the avoidance of harm. Beginning with small
payments by private actors to patients who are experiencing
only minor health problems and are otherwise well-off reduces
the chance that payments would be undue inducements or
would expose recipients to stigma or unforeseen disadvantages.
An example might be an insurance company paying
participants to select lower-cost allergy medications or
treatments for indigestion. These sorts of payments are less
likely to cause harm, but are also less likely to produce large
benefits for patients or for society. In contrast, payments that
are larger, come from state actors, or are received by patients
who have major health problems-for instance, if Medicaid
were to offer large payments for adherence to opioid
treatment-increase the risk of undue inducement or stigma.
However, the appeal of using payments in these more urgent
contexts is that they could potentially generate large benefits
for seriously disadvantaged individuals. Ultimately, outside of
cases where patients are obviously unable to respond rationally
to inducements, the use of payment incentives is a highly
context-dependent decision. There is nothing conceptually
unique about negative prices for health care: they represent
part of a continuum of the incentives and reasons we might
offer people to make health decisions, and one that deserves
greater attention.

